The Failure of Cable Deregulation

A Blueprint For Creating A Competitive, Pro-Consumer Cable Television Marketplace

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Pro-Consumer Cable Television Marketplace

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SUMMARY AND RECOMMENDATIONS

THE PROBLEM: DEREGULATION OF THE CABLE INDUSTRY HAS FAILED

The Telecommunications Act of 1996 restructured the entire telecommunications industry and left virtually all cable subscribers without protection from unrestricted rate hikes. Since the Act was signed into law, cable rates have skyrocketed; service levels have declined; cable concentration has heavily increased; vertical integration between critical programming developers and cable distributors has gone unabated; wireline cable competitors have faced enormous obstacles going head-to-head with cable incumbents; incumbent cable operators have effectively exploited statutory loopholes in order to deny vital programming content to emerging competitors; and the cable industry now also dominates the broadband residential high-speed Internet market.

Cable Rate Hikes Persist

Since enactment of the 1996 Act that deregulated cable rates, consumer cable prices have been rising at three times the rate of inflation and even faster for basic and expanded service, which is the choice of the overwhelming majority of cable subscribers. These rates have risen by more than 50 percent.

Individual markets have suffered much larger increases. For example, New York consumers have been particularly hard hit. In the few years since enactment of the 1996 Act, New York City cable subscribers have seen their bills for the most popular programming tier soar. Cablevision customers in New York City have experienced a cumulative increase of 93.7 percent – nearly doubling monthly bills. Even on the “low” end, Staten Island Cable customers have seen their bills rise 52.5 percent.

Cable price increases have been restrained by competition only when a wireline competitor, often referred to as an overbuilder, enters a market to challenge the incumbent. Where such overbuilder competition exists, the effect is dramatic: The General Accounting Office (GAO) reports that cable rates are 17 percent lower where there is an overbuilder in a franchise area. By contrast, national competition from satellite providers – notwithstanding their increasing market share – has not resulted in lower cable rates.

Although cable operators argue that they face serious competition from the nation’s two Direct Broadcast Satellite (DBS) providers, data compiled by the Federal Communications Commission (FCC) also confirm that DBS, while growing in subscribers, appeals primarily to limited subsets of consumers, and is unable to restrain cable’s prices charged to consumers at large. Wireline competitors have proven effective at forcing cable operators to restrain their prices, but these competitors have entered only a very limited number of markets, due in large part to cable’s concerted anti-competitive efforts to keep them at bay.
With near universality, cable operators have blamed their skyrocketing rates on increases in their programming costs, despite the fact that the principal cable operators receive the most favorable pricing from programmers *vis-à-vis* overbuilders and satellite providers. Most importantly, augmented advertising revenues and revenues from new services more than cover any programming cost increases. Moreover, 40 percent of the top cable channels – which command the highest prices – are owned in whole or in part by cable operators themselves or by companies with large ownership interests in cable operators.

According to FCC data, price increases have occurred even on a per-channel basis, which proves that cable’s “more channels” argument is simply wrong. The cable industry’s “better programming” argument is equally implausible. A number of major cable operators have clearly pushed things in exactly the opposite direction by moving very popular channels off the lower tiers of service and on to the higher tiers, extending the cable strategy of bundling services to “drive consumers to buy bigger and bigger packages of programs at higher prices.”

One way to raise prices is to do so directly; another way is to allow service quality to deteriorate. Cable companies have done both. When it comes to customer service, the cable industry has one of the worst track records of any service industry in the country. The latest American Customer Satisfaction Index – an annual survey by one of the nation’s leading business schools – found that some of the largest cable companies “now rank among the worst rated businesses in the history of the ACSI.”

In reality, ever-escalating consumer rates have flowed profitably to the cable industry’s bottom line. The industry-wide operating margin is anticipated to be nearly $19 billion for 2002, up nearly 60 percent from 1997. And operating revenues per subscriber have commensurately jumped to $273 per year in 2002 from $190 in 1996. For the industry’s largest player, Comcast, this has meant a nearly 36 percent increase in operating cash flow (to $1.597 billion) and operating cash flow margins – “profits” to most people – have reached 36.5 percent in the second quarter of 2003 despite a stagnant national economy and a depressed communications market.

*The Cable Monopoly Continues*

One reason for all the rate hikes that is supported by the facts is the rapid consolidation of the cable industry. These unabated rate increases reflect cable’s enduring dominance in the multichannel video programming market. The FCC’s most recent video competition report found that cable continues to corner the consumer market, controlling more than three-quarters of all subscribers to multichannel video services. The number of cable subscribers has increased in each of the last 25 years and now stands at approximately 72 million – more than three and one-half times as many as cable’s closest rival, DBS.

The 10 largest cable operators serve about 85 percent of all cable subscribers. And the three largest cable operators – Comcast, Time Warner and Charter – together serve approximately 56 percent of all cable subscribers, up from 48 percent in 1996. Consolidation
in the cable industry has been justified on the grounds that bigger companies would operate more efficiently and incur lower costs, which would translate into lower rates.

However, industry consolidation has not led to cost savings for consumers. Comparing rates across small and large cable systems, the FCC expected “to find lower average monthly rates due to increasing economies of scale.” But it found just the opposite – the larger the cable company and the greater the dominance of a region through clustering of systems, the higher its rates.

DBS is widespread, has attracted millions of subscribers and may hold future promise to be a more serious competitor to cable. As the FCC’s data show, however, DBS is not providing effective competition to cable in the most important segments of the market. Rather, even in areas where DBS has achieved significant penetration, “there is no measurable effect on . . . the price of cable service.” Even the cable industry’s own economic experts have acknowledged that “[t]he demand for cable is rather insensitive to . . . the DBS price,” which “indicate[s] that DBS is not a particularly good substitute for cable in the minds of consumers.” Indeed, cable prices have continued to rise steadily over the last decade, even as DBS penetration has risen and its prices have fallen.

This failure of DBS to restrain cable prices also reflects the fact that DBS is popular primarily at two edges of the market – in rural areas where there is no cable service at all, and among the minority of consumers that are willing to pay stiff premiums to receive large numbers of sports channels. DBS also has serious shortcomings that limit its appeal to many cable subscribers. DBS cannot reach many urban customers who lack a direct line of sight to the southern sky, and dishes are often difficult to install in the multi-family dwelling units that house approximately 30 percent of the U.S. population. DBS is still not able to offer local broadcast channels in many markets. Surveys indicate that 47 percent of cable subscribers would not subscribe to satellite service for that reason alone. DBS is also unable to offer customers the same bundles as cable operators, including telephone services, and has been extremely slow in offering efficient two-way high-speed Internet access services. Making matters worse, as the major cable operators have completed their nationwide upgrades to digital facilities, DBS loses the quality advantage it previously could offer to lure high-end subscribers.

**Thwarting Competition**

Cable operators have the incentive and ability to thwart competition in several respects. As FCC reports show, “where permitted, vertically integrated programmers will use foreclosure of programming to provide a competitive edge to their affiliated cable operators.” For example, they continue to deny competing video distributors access to terrestrially (land-based) delivered programming that they own and control, exploiting loopholes in a federal law originally designed to prohibit such anti-competitive conduct. Not only do they own 40 percent of the most popular programming, but of the top 26 channels in terms of subscriber and prime-time ratings, all but one (the Weather Channel) is affiliated with either a principal
cable operator or a broadcast network and eighty-six percent of “must have” regional sports programming is also vertically integrated.

The cable incumbents refuse, or create obstacles, to carry a large amount of programming that is owned or controlled by their competitors. And these operators aggressively attempt to deny competitively vital independent programming to new market entrants through the use of programming contracts, cable-owned content distribution networks and exclusive agreements for equipment, software or other technology.

Cable’s emerging competitors are facing increasing difficulty in obtaining access to cable-owned programming. In New York, for example, Cablevision obtained control of seven of the nine local professional sports teams and still denied an overbuilder, RCN, access even to the overflow programming (games not featured on Cablevision’s Madison Square Garden network) when more than one of the seven teams is playing simultaneously. By contrast, Cablevision did give RCN access to the same sports channels for distribution in those parts of New Jersey where Cablevision is not the dominant provider of cable service.

The recent battle between Cablevision and the YES Network over carriage of Yankee baseball games in the New York metropolitan area is a glaring example of how large incumbent cable operators can and do exercise enormous leverage over new and competing content providers, to the detriment of consumers. Using the impetus of the recent Cablevision-YES dispute in New York, at least one cable incumbent is proposing that Congress allow it to coercively “re-tier” programming that it does not control, particularly sports programming. For example, such a proposal would prohibit programmers from negotiating the carriage of their programming on a specific tier. This proposal does nothing to advance consumer interests, will not reduce cable prices and only benefits cable operators in their bargaining with programmers. The incumbent cable company could favor affiliated programming by placing it on a “preferred tier” at the expense of competing programming.

Cable operators enter into agreements with unaffiliated programming providers with the effect of creating exclusive rights to deliver the programmer’s content. Cable operators are now adapting that practice to lucrative video-on-demand (VOD) services. A number of major cable operators have formed a consortium called iN DEMAND that obtains VOD content from the major Hollywood studios, as well as other attractive programming content (such as sporting events), which is then made available exclusively to the cable operators’ own subscribers. Cable operators are also denying potential competitors access to VOD content indirectly by forming exclusive agreements with equipment suppliers that expressly deny rivals the technology (equipment, software, etc.) necessary to deliver VOD programming.

Cable operators have successfully undermined the leased-access provision of the cable act. Federal law requires cable operators to set aside up to 15 percent of their channel capacity so that unaffiliated programmers may offer competing service packages to consumers. As Congress envisioned it, the purpose of this requirement “is to promote competition in the delivery of diverse sources of video programming and to assure that the widest possible diversity of information sources are made available to the public.” Instead the FCC, with the
support of the cable industry, has successfully undermined this mandate by adopting a pricing methodology that sanctions a per channel rate that no competing programmer could pay and still remain commercially viable.

**Extending the Anticompetitive Model to the Internet**

Cable operators now also dominate the broadband Internet market, comprising a huge new source of profits. Cable now has nearly twice as many subscribers as its nearest broadband competitor, DSL (digital subscriber line). Comcast, the largest cable operator in the nation, has become the largest provider of broadband services, adding 350,900 subscribers in the second quarter of 2003 for a total of approximately 4.4 million subscribers, with its revenue from these services increasing 56.6 percent (to $548 million) over second quarter 2002.

As the largest providers of broadband Internet service, cable operators have become a critical link in the public’s ability to participate in the Internet’s growing virtual “town square” of American discourse and civic activities. The danger that cable’s reign poses to the diversity and democracy of the Internet is quite simple: Cable operators are not required to share their networks with competitive Internet service providers (ISP’s). Independent ISP’s will not be able to provide cable broadband Internet services because they will not have access to cable wires, unless cable operators open their wires and networks to competitors. They will either have to provide DSL reseller service from phone companies or attempt to negotiate access with a cable operator, which is at the discretion of such operators.

Cable operators have taken anti-competitive action to limit access to certain streaming video content to prevent or limit broadcast quality streaming video over their broadband Internet cable modem service as a means of blocking current and future competition for video content. This has created significant concern on behalf of many of the Internet’s leading content providers and e-commerce websites. Some cable operators have also apparently opted to condition the carriage of a video channel upon the provider’s agreement not to distribute the same content over the Internet at all.

**THE SOLUTION: MOVE DECISION MAKING OUT OF WASHINGTON, GIVE CONSUMERS REAL CHOICES AND CREATE CONDITIONS THAT GIVE COMPETITION A CHANCE**

Since its inception and growth throughout the second half of the 20th century, cable television service has brought an enormous amount of popular news and entertainment programming into the living rooms of America. The cable industry has used public rights of ways to access those homes and in turn made huge profits. This report makes clear that the cable industry has not lived up to its public and civic responsibilities as holders of valuable public franchises and licenses. Congress, the FCC, and state and local governments must examine the recommendations made in this report and take appropriate action to restore competition to the multichannel video market. Fortunately, the harmful effects of cable deregulation are not insurmountable. Consumers could still reap the benefits of the 1996 Act’s
pro-competitive intent through a new model. The building blocks of a truly pro-competitive model are as follows:

**Congress must empower state public utility commissions (PUC) to regulate all cable rates and charges for video services until meaningful competition emerges.** Congress should grant state public utility commissions the authority to regulate all cable rates and charges and to combat anti-competitive predatory-pricing business practices. With the 1996 Act’s deregulation, rates for the cable programming tier to which the vast majority of consumers subscribe have inflated without restraint. Consumer rate protections at the state level are needed, but state PUC rate regulation is only necessary and desirable until robust competition that actually disciplines cable prices emerges.

**Return authority to local communities.** Preemptive provisions of the Act have thwarted attempts by local communities to protect cable subscribers from the worst of the industry’s depredations. These preemptive provisions must be abolished so that policy control may be returned to community leaders who are closest to consumers and who are most committed to ensuring that their communities have access to multiple providers of competitively priced video services.

**Introduce à la carte programming requirement to expand consumer choices.** Consumers should be able to choose their own suite of programming, rather than being force-fed the programming tiers that cable operator want them to purchase. Consumers must be given the right to purchase every individual channel on an à la carte basis at fair, reasonable and nondiscriminatory prices.

**Adopt reasonably priced leased-access rates.** Cable operators have avoided their obligation to lease channel capacity to independent programmers by setting the prices so high that no competing provider could possibly pay current fees and remain commercially viable. In order to promote competition with diverse and independent programming, reasonably priced leased access must be adopted. This pro-competitive pricing should be based upon the FCC’s existing rate-setting methodology, which was designed to promote competition in the telecommunications market.

**Ensure consumer input with a public board member.** A public member representing subscribers should be placed on the board of directors of any cable operator with a greater than four percent market share of cable households as a condition of franchise or FCC approval. Such a public member should have no current or prior affiliation with a cable, broadcast or DBS distributor or programmer, or any of their industry trade associations, and should be barred from joining such a board as a public member for five years after serving in any such affiliation. Public members should be selected by a committee of outside directors and approved by the shareholders. This would ensure better consumer input and assist in preventing insider dealing and financial mismanagement, as has occurred with some of the nation’s leading cable operators.
**Empower the viewers and citizens.** Citizen-viewers should have a direct voice in the process of cable regulation and the opportunity to use that voice to create their own well-funded news and public affairs channels. When cities negotiate franchise agreements with cable companies, they should require that cable operators include billing inserts that invite consumers to join a local Cable Action Group that would operate a local Audience Channel, well-funded and equipped by the cable company. Such a group would serve a dual purpose: operating the local channel and organizing consumers into a mobilized interest group to advocate for pro-consumer and pro-democracy media policy. Alternatively, local or state governments could assist in fundraising for the Cable Action Group, by collecting membership dues through inserts in tax or license renewal mailings. Illinois Citizen Utility Board (CUB) is funded in this manner and represents the interests of Illinois gas, electric, phone and other utility ratepayers.

**Ensure access to vital programming.** Newly formed competitors cannot survive, let alone thrive, if cable operators are allowed to continue their anti-competitive practices of locking up must-have programming, such as sports and other regional channels. The existing federal program-access law must be modified to eliminate loopholes that have allowed the cable industry to continue these anti-competitive practices and undermine the emergence of wireline competitors. Additionally, cable operators should be prohibited from entering into exclusive contracts for equipment or other technical services that prevent competitor access to such programming.

**Prohibit cable broadband content restrictions to allow consumers full use of the Internet.** Cable operators have a long history of restricting consumer access to content that cable operators disfavor. With the cable industry’s ongoing dominance of the broadband market, cable operators must be prohibited from restricting consumer access to Internet content based on the source or nature of the consumer’s request.
HISTORY AND BACKGROUND

Cable television started in 1948 as a means of providing signals of local television stations to rural and mountainous areas that could not receive adequate reception of those signals through conventional over-the-air antennas. It was known as Community Antenna Television, and it used large antennas to capture the signals of nearby television stations and then retransmit those signals to homes through coaxial cables owned by the cable operators.

Currently, cable operators must obtain a franchise from a local governmental authority, which permits them to run cables along specified public rights-of-way. The Copyright Revision Act of 1976 grants cable operators a permanent license that allows them to transmit over-the-air television signals through their cable systems. During the 1970s, however, satellite technology developments enabled video signals to be transmitted economically via satellites, leading to the development of new cable networks, such as HBO and CNN, designed to be distributed via satellite to cable systems throughout the country. While broadcast networks gain revenues largely through advertising, these cable networks are supported through advertising, fees paid by cable operators, and in the case of premium pay networks such as HBO and Showtime, by subscriber fees. The cable operator primarily receives three kinds of signals: (1) over-the-air broadcasts by local TV stations from TV towers in the area, (2) signals via satellite from cable networks and (3) terrestrial (land-based) microwave transmissions or delivery over fiber-optic cable. All of these signals are provided to subscribers through the cable system’s wires.

In 1984, Congress adopted the Cable Communications Policy Act of 1984. The act deregulated the rates that cable operators can charge to most consumers. It also standardized the procedure for franchise renewal that gave operators relatively certain renewal and capped franchise fees at 5 percent. In 1992, in response to escalating cable rates following the 1984 act, Congress did an about-face and regulated cable rates as part of the 1992 Cable Act. This statute, passed over a presidential veto, established a benchmark above which cable rates will be deemed excessive. The FCC required that any rates deemed excessive were required to be lowered 17 percent or reduced to the FCC benchmark.

In 1996, Congress did another about-face. It passed the Telecommunications Act of 1996, which deregulated rates for basic cable service (the least expensive tier that includes local over-the-air broadcasts) in areas with “effective competition.” It is estimated that 11 percent of all cable subscribers subscribe only to basic cable service. The Act allowed local franchise authorities to continue to regulate basic cable service, within the limits of FCC rules, where effective competition did not exist. This is true for the overwhelming number of cable franchises across the country. According to the FCC, it is estimated that only 2 percent of all cable households reside in areas with effective competition, and only 1.1 percent of consumers subscribe to the services of an overbuilder.

The Act also established March 31, 1999, as the date for an across-the-board end to federal price regulation of the cable programming service tier (enhanced basic), the tier chosen overwhelmingly by cable subscribers – whether or not there was competition in the
area. In addition, under the 1996 Act, small cable operators are partially or wholly exempt from rate regulation. A “small cable operator” is defined to include any operator that serves fewer than 1 percent of all subscribers in the United States and that is not affiliated with entities that have gross annual revenues exceeding $250 million. In any franchise area where a small cable operator serves fewer than 50,000 subscribers, rate regulation does not apply to the operator’s cable programming services tiers or to its basic tier if it was the only tier subject to regulation as of December 31, 1994. The 1996 Act also authorized phone companies to provide cable services for the first time and established an “open video system” regime, under which an operator can avoid some of the regulatory requirements applied to traditional cable operators in exchange for making a specified percentage of its channels available to unaffiliated video programmers.

Congress passed the Satellite Home Viewer Improvement Act of 1999, facilitating the ability of satellite video providers to beam local broadcast signals back to their home markets. This was important and helpful in the development of DBS. However, it has not led to decreases in cable rates.

The multichannel video distribution industry has evolved into three principal types of service providers, due in part to and certainly enabled by regulatory incentives and disincentives that favor the large incumbent cable operators. The three types of service providers are as follows:

1. MSO – The large incumbent cable operator, also known as a principal multiple system operator (MSO) or principal cable operator, operating cable systems in multiple localities. It usually has a high-capacity, bi-directional, highly interactive wireline network that supports multiple video products, as well as interactive TV, high-speed data, voice and other services. These companies dominate the multichannel video distribution industry.

2. Overbuilder – These are emerging wireline cable providers that build their own cable infrastructure over public rights-of-ways – hence overbuilders – in communities in order to compete with the established incumbent cable operator. It uses the same, or very similar, bi-directional interactive wireline network structure. They are the only competition to incumbent cable operators that has been found to impact price. However, overbuilders hold a very small percentage of the consumer market.

3. DBS – This is direct broadcast satellite. It has been most effective in reaching noncable-served customers in rural areas and enthusiast consumers (e.g., heavy sports users). This provider can compete on certain video products but is limited in its ability to compete for other products such as Internet and telephony supported on a wireline system. EchoStar is the “Dish” network; DIRECTV is the other major satellite network. DBS refers to both of these companies.
Today, several cable operators dominate the cable industry. They are Comcast, Time Warner Cable (part of AOL Time Warner), Charter, Cox Communications, Adelphia Communications, Cablevision, Advance/Newhouse, Mediacom Communications, Insight Communications and CableOne. These companies control approximately 85 percent of all cable subscribers. The largest three companies control 56 percent of all cable subscribers. These companies never compete against one another. The National Cable and Telecommunications Association (NCTA) is the major trade association representing these companies. There are also hundreds of smaller noncompetitive cable operators. The American Cable Association, which represents the interests of owners of independent cable television businesses and smaller cable systems, has a membership of approximately 900 franchised cable businesses, ranging in size from several hundred thousand subscribers to fewer than 100. Today, cable companies claim that about 97 percent of homes in the United States have access to a cable system, and approximately 66 percent of these households subscribe to a cable service.

The only wireline cable franchisees to directly challenge and compete with the major incumbent cable operators are overbuilders. These companies account for approximately 1.3 percent of the cable subscribers nationally. Overbuilder competition is the only competition associated with restraining price increases in cable rates. The two largest overbuilders are RCN (the 11th largest cable company) and WideOpenWest (the 13th largest cable company), serving 506,700 and 310,000 subscribers respectively. Overall, the Broadband Service Provider Association (BSPA), the overbuilder trade association, reports that it serves more than one million subscribers, with franchises authorizing them to serve more than 17 million homes.

Currently there are two major DBS companies competing with cable television – Hughes Electronics’ DIRECTV and EchoStar’s DISH Network. Cablevision, the nation sixth largest cable operator, has announced its intention to establish a competing DBS service in the fall of 2003.

Since the small parabolic “dish” antennae was first marketed in 1994, home subscribership to DBS had grown markedly. Currently, DBS has more than 20 percent of overall multichannel video subscribers as compared to cable’s 76.09 percent. DIRECTV has approximately 12 percent of overall video subscribers and EchoStar has more than 8 percent of overall subscribers. Historically, this growth has occurred in rural areas or in areas not traditionally served by cable. Although DBS is marketing aggressively, DBS market penetration has unfortunately not led to price competition with cable.

General Motors, owners of Hughes Electronics’ DIRECTV, recently announced its intention to sell DIRECTV to Rupert Murdoch’s News Corp., to be integrated into the Fox Entertainment Group. Given Mr. Murdoch’s and News Corp.’s close ties to the cable television industry, were this deal to go forward, it could significantly increase cable’s programming dominance and diminish further DBS’s ability to compete. EchoStar announced an agreement with SBC Communications, the nation’s second largest local phone company,
to offer DBS as part of a package of telecommunications services on a single bill. If this bundling effort is successful and expands, it could enhance DBS competitiveness.

**CABLE RATE HIKES CONTINUE**

**NATIONAL PRICE TRENDS**

Congress deregulated cable rates in 1984 as part of broad legislation aimed at establishing a national policy for the rapidly growing cable industry. Within a few years, a chorus of consumer complaints, an FCC Study (1990) and congressional surveys (in 1989, 1990 and 1991) all concluded that cable rates had increased considerably faster than inflation. See Figure 1. Figure 1 shows the increase in the total package of services purchased by consumers. Average monthly rates for basic, enhanced and premium services increased by 55 to 60 percent between 1986 and 1991 – nearly three times faster than the Consumer Price Index (CPI). Between 1986 and 1989 alone, the price of basic cable service rose 40 percent.

**Figure 1: Long Term View of Cable Price Increases**

![Graph showing cable price increases](image)

Source: See Figure Notes

The 1992 Cable Act authorized the FCC to roll back cable rates that were too high. The Commission established a benchmark; rates above the benchmark would be deemed excessive. The FCC ordered cable operators to reduce their rates to the benchmark or to cut them by 17 percent. The short period of rate relief resulting from the 1992 Act is evident in Figure 1 – the brief respite enjoyed by consumers during 1993-95.

On February 8, 1996, President Clinton signed the Telecommunications Act of 1996. This bill restructured the entire telecommunications industry and left most cable television consumers without protection from unrestricted rate hikes. Since the 1996 Act was signed into
law, cable rates have skyrocketed; industry concentration has heavily increased; vertical integration between critical programming and cable distributors has gone unabated; overbuilders have faced enormous obstacles going head to head with cable incumbents; and the cable industry has now begun to dominate the residential broadband high-speed Internet market.

The 1996 Act established March 31, 1999 as the date for an across-the-board end to federal price regulation of all service tiers above the basic tier, including the cable programming service tier (often called the “enhanced basic” package),\textsuperscript{38} the tier chosen by the overwhelming majority of cable subscribers.\textsuperscript{39} It also authorized the FCC to stop regulating the prices immediately for the few cable operators that could demonstrate that their “basic” service tier faced effective competition. Additionally the 1996 Act authorized phone companies to begin providing competing video services, although few have done so.

In 1992, Congress, concerned about rising cable rates, directed the FCC to publish an annual report on cable industry prices including to what extent competition is successfully restraining prices.\textsuperscript{40} According to those FCC reports, cable rates for basic and expanded basic service have risen by 53 percent nationwide since 1996. \textit{See} Figure 2. Backing out inflation, real rate increases have been nearly 35 percent since 1996.\textsuperscript{41}

\textbf{Figure 2: Details on Cable Rate Increases After the 1992 Act}

Source: See Figure Notes

Not surprisingly, approximately two-thirds of the post-1996 Telecom Act increases occurred from 1999 to 2002, after the “cable programming services” tier was completely deregulated.
According to the FCC’s most recent analysis – released in July 2003 – cable rates rose over 8 percent during the period from July 2001 to July 2002 — from $37.06 a month to over $40. The FCC price report released the prior year examined the impact of wireline overbuilder competition on cable rates. The FCC found that cable offers a lower rate only when an overbuilder enters a market to challenge the incumbent. That year, the FCC found cable service tiers are on average 6.3 percent lower in areas where incumbent operators face effective competition from overbuilders. In its most recent report the FCC found that cable service tiers were on average 6.4 percent lower in areas where incumbent operators face effective competition from overbuilders.

Even more drastically, an October 2002 report by the United States General Accounting Office (GAO) found that “the presence of a second cable franchise (known as an overbuilder) does appear to restrain cable prices. In franchise areas with a second cable provider, cable prices are approximately 17 percent lower than in comparable areas without a second cable provider.” These findings by the FCC and GAO confirm the importance of promoting wireline competition as the only documented means of restraining cable rates for consumers.

The FCC and GAO reports do not take into account the most recent cable rate hikes. In what has become an “annual holiday tradition,” the nation’s major cable operators announced in December 2002 a new round of cable rate hikes, which took effect at the beginning of 2003. The latest hikes are typically in the range of 5 to 8 percent, and in some cases as high as 10 percent. These hikes are well above historical averages. In fact, according to one trade press report, “[r]ate increases in 2001 were about 150 percent above the average increase since 1955.”

Consumer groups have reached the same conclusion as the FCC regarding cable rates. According to the Consumer Federation of America and Consumers Union, “cable operators moved aggressively to increase prices upon deregulation,” and that “[t]heir behavior was consistent with the exercise of market power.”

Figure 2 suggests this exercise of market power in another way. The very large increase in basic and expanded basic prices reflects two factors: increases in the number of channels, and the ability of companies with pricing power to engage in price discrimination. Basic and expanded basic rates increase more rapidly because consumers are less able to reduce their demand.

**Many Local Price Increases Have Been Even Larger**

Nationally, the Consumers Union says the cost of “expanded basic” service has jumped 45 percent since 1996. That’s nearly triple the rate of inflation. The Consumer Federation of America called the recent “holiday round of cable rate hikes” an “unwelcome gift to consumers” that “is part of a troubling trend that dates back to 1996,” and proves that “cable deregulation is not benefiting consumers as promised.” A sampling of selected markets shows that cable rates have been rising across the country. See Figure 3.
Figure 3: Cable Rate Hikes: 1999-2002, Selected Markets

Sources: See Figure Notes.

New York consumers have been particularly hard hit by ever-escalating cable rate increases. For the most popular tier of cable programming – to which all but a handful of customers subscribe – New York City cable subscribers saw increases ranging from 93.7 percent for Cablevision customers to 52.5 percent for Staten Island Cable customers during the period since enactment of the Telecommunications Act of 1996. See Table 1.
Table 1. New York City Cable Rates

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Cable Company</th>
<th>Rate in effect</th>
<th>Nominal Rate Increase</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>February 1996</td>
<td>February 2003</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cablevision</td>
<td>$28.01</td>
<td>$54.24</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Staten Island Cable (Time Warner)</td>
<td>$30.34</td>
<td>$46.28</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Time Warner Manhattan North</td>
<td>$30.18</td>
<td>$46.77</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Time Warner Manhattan South</td>
<td>$30.18</td>
<td>$46.77</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Time Warner Brooklyn-Queens</td>
<td>$30.51</td>
<td>$47.17</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Rates are for the “cable programming tier” – the service tier to which a vast majority of cable customers subscribe.

Source: City of New York, Department of Information Technology and Telecommunications Office of Franchise Administration and Planning

As described in more detail below, these unabated rate increases reflect cable’s enduring dominance in the multichannel video programming market. As one leading analyst succinctly noted, “[c]able is one of the few sectors of the broader market that has demonstrated consistent pricing power in recent years.”\(^{55}\) Indeed, the FCC’s 2002 video competition report found that cable continues to corner the consumer market, being available to 97.6 percent of all TV households\(^ {56}\) and controlling more than three-quarters of all subscribers to multichannel video services.\(^ {57}\) As of June 2002, the number of cable subscribers has increased in each of the last 25 years, and, according to the FCC, stands at approximately 72 million – over three and a half times as many as DBS, cable’s closest rival.\(^ {58}\)

Ever escalating consumer rates have flowed profitably to the cable industry’s bottom line. The industry-wide operating margin is anticipated to be nearly $19 billion for 2002. And operating revenues per subscriber have commensurately jumped to $273 per year in 2002, from $208 in 1997.\(^ {59}\) For the industry’s largest player, Comcast, this has meant a 35.7 percent increase in operating cash flow (to $1.597 billion) and operating cash flow margins – “profits” to most people -- have reached 36.5 percent for the second quarter of 2003 despite a stagnant national economy and a depressed communications market.\(^ {60}\)

Many local regulators – who have been stripped of their authority to regulate rates for the programming tier to which the vast majority of consumers subscribe – have expressed
outrage over recent cable rate hikes. Cable operators are often “the only game in town, so they can get away with it”61 – there’s nothing local regulators can do but sit back and “look forward to rate hikes and service cutbacks.”62 See Table 2. In response to Comcast’s recent announcement of a 7.8 percent rate hike in Boston, the director of the city’s cable TV office stated “[w]e’re frustrated by this. . . These rate increases are a lot more than what the Bureau of Labor Statistics is saying the cost-of-living increase has been this year.”63

### Table 2. Local Regulators are Helpless and Outraged

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Location</th>
<th>Quote</th>
<th>Source</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Enterprise, AL</td>
<td>“I am extremely disappointed that Adelphia is raising cable rates at a time when corporate greed and owner misconduct have forced them to file bankruptcy . . . It gives the appearance of requiring Enterprise cable subscribers to pay for the transgressions of Adelphia owners.”</td>
<td>Mayor Tim Alford</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Los Angeles, CA</td>
<td>“We’re disappointed that consumers have to pay for the financial problems at Adelphia [through rate increases]. . . We hope they reconsider their decision, and the mayor is going to continue to work to see if that can come about.”</td>
<td>Deputy Mayor Matt Middlebrook</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Oakland, CA</td>
<td>“Oakland already has higher rates and fewer channels than other Bay Area cities….AT&amp;T hasn’t) done anything to justify the rate increase.”</td>
<td>City Clerk Ceda Floyd</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Simi Valley, CA</td>
<td>“This is an unconscionable way for Adelphia to enter our community, increasing rates over which we, as a city council, have no control and stripping our ability to protect our community’s cable customers from escalating costs.”</td>
<td>Mayor Bill Davis</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Colorado Springs, CO</td>
<td>“It’s a black hole . . . I would want us to be able to say we’re monitoring it to the public.”</td>
<td>Councilmember Jim Null regarding the lack of restrictions on cable rate increases</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jacksonville, FL</td>
<td>“When I picked up Saturday’s paper, I was fried. Dumbfounded.”</td>
<td>Mayor John Delaney on reading AT&amp;T’s full-page ad announcing higher prices</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jacksonville, FL</td>
<td>“I had worked hard . . . to build a bridge, to build a relationship, to try to solve the problem…We’re [not] even asking for perfection. But you like to at least have good-faith effort, and we haven’t been getting that.”</td>
<td>Council President Matt Carlucci</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dubuque, IA</td>
<td>“Lo and behold [Mediacom] stopped paying their [franchise fees], then they turn around and raise their rates. It seems an odd logic.”</td>
<td>Cable-franchise administrator Merrill Crawford</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Boise, ID</td>
<td>“We’ve received more than a hundred calls in the last month, but there’s not a lick we can do about it. . . This happens whenever the cable company makes changes or raises rates. But the city can’t do anything about rates.”</td>
<td>City budget director Alec Andrus</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sycamore City, IL</td>
<td>“I feel this is really an in-your-face reactive approach . . . It leaves a bad taste in our mouths, especially with the franchise agreement coming up within the next year, and we will remember this.”</td>
<td>City Administrator Bill Nicklas on AT&amp;T raising cable rates on short notice</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Barnstable, MA</td>
<td>“The only option you’ve got is to find competition” (which Barnstable officials have not been able to do).</td>
<td>Chairman of the Cable Advisory Committee David Cole</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Worcester, MA</td>
<td>“They’re the only game in town so they can get away with it.”</td>
<td>Councilor-at-large Michael C. Perotto, member of the Public Service and Transportation Committee</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Montgomery County, MD</td>
<td>“We viewed the [AT&amp;T/Comcast] transfer as a very unwise decision…We’re going to be at great risk for the company failing, and it’s not going to be good for residents along the way . . . We can look forward to rate hikes and service cutbacks.”</td>
<td>Cable Communications Advisory Committee member Don Libes</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Table 2. Local Regulators are Helpless and Outraged

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<thead>
<tr>
<th>Location</th>
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</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Montgomery County, MD</td>
<td>“I was extremely disappointed to learn that Comcast has decided to institute another rate increase, the second in nine months, especially following two successive years in which complaints to the County’s Cable Office more than doubled and reached the highest level ever.”&lt;br&gt;– Councilmember Marilyn Praisner</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Holland, MI</td>
<td>“I think it’s arrogant of [AT&amp;T] to pass this along just because they can...It simply is gouging an overpriced system.”&lt;br&gt;– Community Access Television Advisory Commissioner Carl Heideman</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sedalia, MO</td>
<td>“They [Charter] run the whole show, and we have nothing to say.”&lt;br&gt;– Councilmember Lawrence Roe</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gulfport, MS</td>
<td>“I didn’t know anything about the rates going up until I opened my mail...They were at a City Council meeting two weeks ago, and they didn’t mention anything about it at all...Most people think the city can do something about it. The truth is, our hands are tied.”&lt;br&gt;– Mayor Ken Combs</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cary, NC</td>
<td>“The rates are absolutely outrageous...Unfortunately, we have very little control over them at the local level.”&lt;br&gt;– Mayor Koka Booth</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Akron, NY</td>
<td>“The deregulation of the cable industry has given us in rural areas a monopoly over which there is no control of the prices charged.”&lt;br&gt;– Mayor Michael Charles</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Buffalo, NY</td>
<td>“As a result of deregulation, cable rates have risen astronomically, both locally and nationally. We don’t have authority to approve or reject the increase. We do have a right to complain.”&lt;br&gt;– Common Council President James W. Pitts</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dallas, TX</td>
<td>“You come down here and rub our noses in this rate increase...Your service is lousy, but I really think your public relations is as lousy as your rate increase request.”&lt;br&gt;– Councilmember Donna Blumer to AT&amp;T</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Sources: See Table Notes. (AT&T purchased by Comcast Dec. 2002)

Congress has begun to take notice again as well. Soon after the FCC released its rate survey in April 2002, Senator John McCain (R-Ariz.) requested that the GAO initiate another independent review of the basis for cable rate increases. On May 6, 2003, Senator McCain, Chairman of the Committee on Commerce, Science & Transportation, held a hearing on “pricing and competition in the programming and distribution market.” While the GAO’s witness testified that work remains ongoing and that the agency’s report would not be issued until October, he was unequivocal that the “FCC’s 2002 survey does not provide a reliable source of information on the cost factors underlying cable rate increases.”

In other words, the FCC’s finding that cable systems subject to wireline competition exhibit only a 6.3 percent “competitive differential” is suspect, particularly compared to GAO’s findings that wireline competition keeps cable rates lower by an average of 17 percent.

Senator McCain has reacted with considerable concern to these cable price hikes: “[T]he FCC released its annual report on cable rate increases in which it has found that the cable industry raised its rates an astounding 8.2% during the 12-month period ending July 1, 2002. By comparison, the Consumer Price Index increased 1.5%. This means that cable rates increased an unbelievable 5½ times faster than inflation. The cable industry has risen to new heights in their apparent willingness and ability to gouge the American consumer. … These
increases defy logic."66 Indeed, while awaiting the GAO’s anticipated report in September, the Senator says that “something is going to have to be done because apparently competition isn't working.”67

CABLE PRICES AND PROGRAMMING QUALITY

That cable prices have risen sharply since 1996 is beyond dispute. The cable industry argues, however, that price increases have been justified by the provision of more channels and better quality programming,68 and increases in their own programming costs from content providers such as ESPN.69 This chapter examines each of these claims in turn.

ADDITIONAL CHANNELS DO NOT JUSTIFY CABLE’S RATE HIKES

The “more channels” argument is plainly wrong. The FCC analyzes prices on both a per-channel and a service-tier basis, and finds price increases both ways.70 While the FCC has found per-channel price increases on a national basis, analysis of cable rate increases at the local level demonstrate the impact of rate hikes on consumers. In Denver, for example, AT&T’s per-channel rates increased 6.9 percent in 2001; in Montgomery County, Maryland, they rose 5.6 percent. In 2001, Cablevision “led the industry with its rate increases for basic cable service,” even though at the time it was “the only major operator that has not yet launched digital video.”71 Industry analysts have concluded that, despite ongoing industry consolidation, “there was little reason to expect either a burst of new programming choices or any slackening in the fast pace of rate increases.”72

Equally telling with regard to the “more channels” argument is the FCC’s finding that, “[i]n areas where a wireline overbuild is present, cable subscribers receive more channels at lower prices . . .”73 Indeed, the FCC concludes that rates are 6.3 percent lower in the aggregate and 9.4 percent lower per channel in markets where a cable company faces competition from an overbuilder, not just from satellite.74 “In those areas where a cable operator faces effective competition from an overbuilder . . . operators tend to offer more channels at a lower rate.”75

Since 1999, when rates were officially and finally deregulated, prices have increased in each year-to-year comparison considered by the FCC’s cable price reports.76 The average annual increase for noncompetitive systems was about twice as large as the increase for competitive systems. This strongly reinforces the conclusion that the problem is lack of competition, not higher programming costs. The only other plausible explanation is that cable incumbents that do face competition are engaged in predatory pricing against challengers in the few markets where wireline challengers exist.

BETTER QUALITY PROGRAMMING DOES NOT JUSTIFY CABLE’S RATE HIKES

The “better programming” argument is equally implausible. To begin with, a number of major cable operators have clearly pushed things in exactly the opposite direction by moving very popular channels off the lower tiers of service and on to the higher tiers. The cable subscribers targeted with this migration strategy are abruptly informed that favorite
channels (like HBO for *The Sopranos* or *Sex and the City*) have been removed entirely from the analog tiers of service and are now available only on the digital tier of service.\(^77\) As the Consumer Federation/Consumers Union report concluded, the cable industry has used new bundling arrangements to “driv[e] consumers to buy bigger and bigger packages of programs at higher prices.”\(^78\) See Table 3.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Operator – System</th>
<th>Channels Moved to Digital Tier</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>AT&amp;T – Oakland, CA</td>
<td>Premium channels</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AT&amp;T – Palo Alto, CA</td>
<td>Turner Classic Movies, Ovation, Independent Film Channel, Sundance Channel</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AT&amp;T – Richmond, VA</td>
<td>Sci-Fi Channel, Turner Classic Movies, Trinity Broadcasting, Fox Movie Channel</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AT&amp;T – San Carlos, CA</td>
<td>HBO, Showtime, Starz!</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AT&amp;T – Seattle, WA</td>
<td>Premium channels, including HBO, Cinemax and Showtime</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Charter – Northern Nevada</td>
<td>All premium movie channels, including HBO, Cinemax and Showtime</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Charter – Salamanca, NY</td>
<td>Premium channels, including HBO, Cinemax and Showtime</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Insight – Springfield, IL</td>
<td>Sci-Fi Channel, Court TV, Turner Classic Movies</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Time Warner – Memphis, TN</td>
<td>Premium channels, including HBO, Cinemax and Showtime</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Time Warner – Milwaukee, WI</td>
<td>HBO Plus</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Sources: See Table Notes. (AT&T purchased by Comcast Dec. 2002)

As discussed above, the Bureau of Labor Statistics, which tracks cable rates in parallel with the FCC, adjusts prices for both the number and the quality of channels offered – and it too has consistently concluded that cable prices have been rising faster than inflation.\(^79\)

While popular programming is being moved to the digital tier, this tier is expensive. Access to the digital tier costs an extra $15 per month\(^80\) including service and the set top converter. These prices have been rising at about 5 percent per year since 1999.\(^81\)
HIGHER PROGRAMMING COSTS DO NOT JUSTIFY CABLE’S RATE HIKES

Cable industry claims of increasing costs of their programming inputs – particularly Disney-owned ESPN – cannot justify their ever-increasing consumer rates. As FCC Commissioner Adelstein explained in his concurrence to the 2002 report on cable industry prices released in July of 2003, the cable industry’s justification is suspect on its face: “[F]or this year’s Report, cable operators attributed an average of 65.8 percent of their rate increases to programming costs, yet the Commission has not conducted even minimal audits to ensure the accuracy of this information. In rough calculations using this figure, if programming costs comprise about 30 percent of total costs, and rates went up an average of 8.2 percent, this would imply that all programming costs went up an average of 17.9 percent, which appears to be an unusually high increase.”

If rising programming costs are having an effect on cable rates, they have yet to harm cable’s bottom line. To the contrary, “[o]perating margins have been increasing dramatically since 1997,” during the same period that programming costs supposedly rose the most.

In 2002, the operating margin for the cable industry was nearly $19 billion, up nearly 60 percent from 1997. Operating revenues per subscriber have increased by more than 30 percent during that same period. Cable companies’ costs for digital programming are still nearly 25 percent lower than what DBS pays.

In reality, augmented advertising revenues and revenues from new services are more than offsetting any programming cost increases that the major cable operators currently may be experiencing. Indeed, since 1996, increases in cable advertising revenues alone have far outpaced any programming cost increases – by more than $2.6 billion. See Table 4. And while the cable industry points specifically to ESPN programming cost increases, with the substantial penetration of ESPN and other sports programming services, sports advertising revenues have nearly doubled, from $231 million to $455 million.

Table 4. Increased Revenues Outpace Costs

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Cable Advertising Revenues</th>
<th>Programming Costs</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1996</td>
<td>$ 6.79 billion</td>
<td>1996 $ 5.66 billion</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2002</td>
<td>14.71 billion</td>
<td>2002 10.99 billion</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The industry’s positive position is reflected in individual company results. Comcast, which released its second quarter earnings report for 2003 and had large gains in its cable division, demonstrates that augmented advertising revenues and revenues from new services more than cover any programming cost increases. Pro forma Comcast revenue for the quarter ended June 30, 2003, was $5.685 billion, representing a 9.2 percent increase from the second quarter of 2002. Operating income rose to $611 million.
For 2003, it is estimated that Comcast will generate in excess of $17.6 billion in cable revenues, reflecting a 9.8 percent growth, and approximately $6.3 billion in earnings before interest, taxes, depreciation and amortization (EBIDTA), or 40.8 percent growth. Indeed, for the second quarter of 2003, Comcast had over 350,000 net additions to its cable modem subscriber base, with a total of nearly 4.4 million. Additionally, Comcast announced it had added 56,900 new basic-service subscribers during the first quarter and 12,100 basic subscribers in the second quarter, and was projecting as many as 100,000 new subscribers for 2003. Comcast has well over 21 million cable subscribers, giving it approximately 30 percent of the nation’s cable business. Of these, Comcast has a total of 6.787 million digital subscribers, reflecting 169,000 additions to these new and most profitable services.

The $1 billion that Comcast earns in advertising revenue places it in the same league as the ABC and NBC networks, according to Comcast Communications president Steve Burke, and Comcast plans to be “the No. 1 source for local advertising.” Comcast may be well on its way to meeting this goal, having experienced an 8 percent growth in advertising revenue in the first quarter of 2003. And Comcast intends to continue to fuel this growth with its foray into video-on-demand (VOD), which will reach 50 percent of Comcast’s subscribers by year-end 2003 and 80 percent by year-end 2004. Burke says the VOD technology “is perfect for advertising.”

In reality, the principal cable operators – Comcast, AOL Time Warner, Charter, Cox, Adelphia, and Cablevision – receive the most favorable pricing from programmers vis-à-vis overbuilders and satellite providers. The programming expenses for DBS operators are in the range of 37-40 percent of their monthly revenue while programming costs for the major cable operators are estimated to be 29 percent for basic programming and 28 percent for digital programming of monthly revenue. Due to volume discounts and other concessions that the major cable operators are able to extract from programmers, even increases in programming costs benefit these incumbent operators from a competitive standpoint.

Cable companies have managed to thrive despite rising costs in part because they themselves own many of the channels carried on their systems. As consumer groups have recently exposed: “Of the 26 top cable channels in subscribers’ and prime time ratings, all but one of them (the Weather Channel) has ownership interest of either a cable operator or a broadcast network” and “40 percent of the top channels . . . which command the highest prices, are owned in whole or in part by cable operators or companies that have large ownership stakes in cable companies.” Holding companies that own both cable systems and programming arms don’t lose money when they boost cash flows from one subsidiary to another. See Table 5. Many of the cable networks are also supported by advertisers, thereby adding to – not subtracting from – the cable company’s bottom line. Thus, cable is using the classic tactic of moving revenues from one pocket to another.
Table 5. Cable Ownership of National Programming Networks

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Programming Network (Top 20 Rank)</th>
<th>Cable Operator Ownership (Interest)</th>
<th>Programming Network (Top 20 Rank)</th>
<th>Cable Operator Ownership (Interest)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Action Max</td>
<td>AOL Time Warner (100 percent)</td>
<td>HBO</td>
<td>AOL Time Warner (100 percent)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AMC (19)</td>
<td>Cablevision (60 percent)</td>
<td>HBO Latino</td>
<td>AOL Time Warner (100 percent)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Animal Planet</td>
<td>Cox (19.7 percent)</td>
<td>HBO 2</td>
<td>AOL Time Warner (100 percent)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>@Max</td>
<td>AOL Time Warner (100 percent)</td>
<td>HBO Signature</td>
<td>AOL Time Warner (100 percent)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cartoon Network</td>
<td>AOL Time Warner (100 percent)</td>
<td>HBO Comedy</td>
<td>AOL Time Warner (100 percent)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cinemax</td>
<td>AOL Time Warner (100 percent)</td>
<td>HBO Family</td>
<td>AOL Time Warner (100 percent)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CNN (6)</td>
<td>AOL Time Warner (100 percent)</td>
<td>HBO Zone</td>
<td>AOL Time Warner (100 percent)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CNN En Español</td>
<td>AOL Time Warner (100 percent)</td>
<td>iN DEMAND</td>
<td>Comcast (55 percent), AOL Time Warner (33 percent), Cox (11 percent)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CNN Headline News</td>
<td>AOL Time Warner (100 percent)</td>
<td>Independent Film Channel</td>
<td>Cablevision (60 percent)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CNN International</td>
<td>AOL Time Warner (100 percent)</td>
<td>MoreMAX</td>
<td>AOL Time Warner (100 percent)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CNNfn</td>
<td>AOL Time Warner (100 percent)</td>
<td>Much Music USA</td>
<td>Cablevision (75 percent)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Comedy Central</td>
<td>AOL Time Warner (50 percent)</td>
<td>Outdoor Life Network</td>
<td>Comcast (100 percent)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Court TV</td>
<td>AOL Time Warner (50 percent)</td>
<td>OuterMax</td>
<td>AOL Time Warner (100 percent)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Discovery Channel (4)</td>
<td>Cox (24.6 percent)</td>
<td>Ovation: The Arts Network</td>
<td>AOL Time Warner (4.2 percent)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Discovery Civilization</td>
<td>Cox (12.3 percent)</td>
<td>Product Info. Network (PIN)</td>
<td>Cox (45 percent)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Discovery Español</td>
<td>Cox (24.6 percent)</td>
<td>QVC (13)</td>
<td>Comcast (57 percent) (however, sale of stake to Liberty Media Corp. pending.)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Discovery Health</td>
<td>Cox (24.6 percent), Comcast (20 percent)</td>
<td>Style</td>
<td>Comcast (50 percent)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Discovery HD Theatre</td>
<td>Cox (24.6 percent), Comcast (20 percent)</td>
<td>TBS (1)</td>
<td>AOL Time Warner (100 percent)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Discovery Home &amp; Leisure</td>
<td>Cox (24.6 percent)</td>
<td>TLC (16)</td>
<td>Cox (24.6 percent)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Discovery Kids</td>
<td>Cox (24.6 percent)</td>
<td>Thriller Max</td>
<td>AOL Time Warner (100 percent)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Discovery Science</td>
<td>Cox (24.6 percent)</td>
<td>TNT (6)</td>
<td>AOL Time Warner (100 percent)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Discovery Wings</td>
<td>Cox (24.6 percent)</td>
<td>Travel Channel</td>
<td>Cox (24.6 percent)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>E! Entertainment</td>
<td>Comcast (50 percent)</td>
<td>Turner Classic Movies</td>
<td>AOL Time Warner (100 percent)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
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<th>Cable Operator Ownership (Interest)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>5StarMax</td>
<td>AOL Time Warner (100 percent)</td>
<td>Viewers Choice 1-10 and Hot Choice (11 multiplexed channels)</td>
<td>Cox (20 percent), AOL Time Warner (17 percent)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fox Sports Net (2 channels)</td>
<td>Cablevision (50 percent)</td>
<td>WE</td>
<td>Cablevision (60 percent)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>G4 Video Gaming Network</td>
<td>Comcast (94 percent)</td>
<td>WMAX</td>
<td>AOL Time Warner (100 percent)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Golf Channel</td>
<td>Comcast (91 percent)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


**CABLE PRICES AND SERVICE QUALITY**

One way to raise prices is to do so directly; another way is to allow service quality to deteriorate. Cable operators have done both. When it comes to customer service, the cable industry has one of the most criticized track records of any service industry in the country.

Although Congress set out to deregulate the cable industry in 1984, it was persuaded by cable’s history of poor customer service to preserve the right of local franchise authorities to require, as part of a franchise, provisions for the enforcement of customer service requirements.

By 1992, however, Congress found that poor customer service in the cable industry was as prevalent as ever. “[C]able operators frequently break installation and repair appointments, subject customers to frequent service interruptions, fail to answer customer calls or place customers on hold for extended periods, and ignore or are slow to respond to customer billing inquiries.”

A Consumer Reports survey at that time found that “consumers are less satisfied with their local cable system than with any other type of service Consumer Reports has rated.” Congress accordingly concluded that leaving cable customer service up to local authorities was not sufficient. It directed the FCC to establish new federal customer service standards that local authorities could enforce. The new standards were to include, at a minimum, requirements governing cable systems’ office hours and telephone availability; installations, outages and service calls; and communications between cable companies and subscribers, including standards governing bills and refunds. Although Congress decided to deregulate cable rates in 1996, it left these service-quality provisions in place.

Despite these regulatory efforts, cable’s customer service remains abysmal. The May 2002 American Customer Satisfaction Index (ACSI) – an annual survey by the University of Michigan Business School – found that three of the then nation’s largest cable companies –
AT&T Broadband, Comcast and Charter – “now rank among the worst rated businesses in the history of the ACSI.”\textsuperscript{108}

The May 2003 ACSI report confirmed this trend, stating:

The customer satisfaction scores for Cable TV remain dismal. No other industry in the ACSI has lower scores. Comcast (down 2%) and Charter Communications (up 4%) both score 55, which is lower than the Internal Revenue Service. That doesn’t mean that people enjoy paying taxes more than they do watching cable TV, but in the context of what these organizations do, the former offers more satisfactory assistance than the latter. Obviously, the nature of the “product” colors the experience, which is why it is all that more remarkable for any company to have such low levels of customer satisfaction. In most competitive situations, such scores are not sustainable: Either the firms improve or they are forced out of business. Things appear to be different in the cable TV industry. Whereas many industries lack pricing power today, this is not the case for Cable TV. Prices have gone up more than in just about any other sector in the economy. Price hikes in the absence of satisfied customers are possible only if consumer choice is restricted.\textsuperscript{109}

A recent study by J.D. Power and Associates found that incumbent cable companies consistently score below overbuilders and DBS providers in customer satisfaction.\textsuperscript{110} See Figure 4. Other independent studies have reached similar conclusions.\textsuperscript{111} And cable operators themselves have acknowledged that “[f]rom a customer care perspective, we weren’t doing a really good job,”\textsuperscript{112} that they are “embarrassed about the service problems”\textsuperscript{113} and have “dropped the ball on some issues.”\textsuperscript{114}

Figure 4: J.D. Power 2002 Cable/Satellite TV Customer Satisfaction Study

![Customer Satisfaction Index Score](image-url)

While local regulators retain some limited authority to monitor cable’s customer service, getting cable to live up to its obligations has proven extremely difficult. Local regulators throughout the country continue to express frustration over the large and increasing numbers of consumer complaints they receive. See Table 6. In Los Angeles, for example, formal consumer complaints about cable service increased 117 percent in 2001, “an escalating trend that city regulators expect to continue, according to a preliminary report from the city.”

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Location</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Los Angeles, CA</td>
<td>“Whenever there’s a change, we get a flood of calls for both information and formal complaints.”</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>– Telecommunications Regulatory Officer Stacy Burnette on cable upgrades, high-speed data offerings and consolidation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>San Francisco, CA</td>
<td>“Generally, customer service has gone downhill under AT&amp;T . . . It has been really hard to get through to a human being.”</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>– Dept. of Telecommunications and Information Services Deputy Director Denise Brady</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Boca Raton, FL</td>
<td>There have been complaints about poor customer service and property damage done by cable installers. Those complaints don’t count service problems that were reported directly to the cable company.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>– Boca spokesperson Constance Scott</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Port St. Lucie, FL</td>
<td>“That [fine] was for [previous service] outages . . . Now it’s mushroomed into a different problem. Now it’s much larger than that . . . My biggest concern is their response to the customers . . . It’s totally unacceptable.”</td>
</tr>
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<td>– Councilmember Jack Kelly</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chicago, IL</td>
<td>“They just make an attempt here and an attempt there” (with no real improvement).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>– Trustee Lloyd Baker on AT&amp;T’s answering of customer service calls</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Amherst, MA</td>
<td>“The level of frustration we experience comes, I think, from a large corporation that seems inaccessible to customers.”</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>– Director of Administration and Finance Nancy Maglione on AT&amp;T’s poor customer service, lack of responsiveness and rate increases</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lakeville, MA</td>
<td>AT&amp;T is “definitely below standard . . . It takes an average call well over half a minute to reach a live person. They have the rights under deregulation laws to change their rates and their channels, but we can attack them on their poor customer service.”</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>– Selectman Chawner Hurd</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sudbury, MA</td>
<td>“As a committee, we still feel that AT&amp;T could improve their customer service, and the sense that we have is that the local people felt that way as well.”</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>– Cable Committee Chair Jeff Winston</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dearborn Heights, MI</td>
<td>“People are frustrated. They still call and complain, but they have to understand that we have almost no control over anything that affects the basic customer.”</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>– Dearborn Heights Assistant Corporate Attorney Kurt Heise on consumer complaints concerning cable customer service</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Suffolk, VA</td>
<td>“They don’t deliver basic cable service the way they’re supposed to . . . It’s time for Charter to go.”</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>– Councilmember Thomas Woodward Jr.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Many local authorities have begun to take action. Some have prescribed customer-service standards that are more stringent than those the FCC has prescribed. Others have
threatened fines unless service quality improves.\textsuperscript{117} Still others have demanded moratoriums on rate increases.\textsuperscript{118} Some have threatened to revoke or fail to renew the incumbent’s franchise altogether.\textsuperscript{119} And in at least one state, cable’s practices have prompted a statewide investigation by the state attorney general.\textsuperscript{120} But even these actions have done virtually nothing to reform the cable industry.

Cable’s main defense of its poor customer-service quality has been to point to the large amounts of capital it has invested to upgrade its systems to provide new services – such as digital cable, cable modem service and cable telephony.\textsuperscript{121}

The National Cable & Telecommunications Association (NCTA) estimates that the cable industry has invested more than $70 billion to provide consumers new services since passage of the 1996 Act through 2002.\textsuperscript{122} While that may seem like a large amount at first glance, it is less compared to the amount that other segments of the communications industry have invested during the same period. Wireless companies, for example, have invested more than $80 billion since the 1996 Act through June 2002.\textsuperscript{123}

Many local franchising authorities are indeed complaining that cable has not invested fast enough and is not fulfilling its promises to implement system upgrades. See Table 7. Increasingly, cable operators are opting to cut costs by slowing the build-out process, even when doing so puts them in breach of franchise agreements and other regulatory commitments and obligations. Local regulators are responding with stiff fines.\textsuperscript{124} Some have demanded refunds for cash already paid to help fund upgrades.\textsuperscript{125} Others have attempted to block national mergers (e.g., AT&T/Comcast) on the grounds that a merged company would have even less financial commitment to completing upgrades already promised.\textsuperscript{126}

In any event, upgrades in new services cannot logically be used to explain declining service quality for existing ones. The amount spent on cable upgrades pays for itself with the brand-new revenue streams they create. Cable companies have indeed admitted that they are recovering their upgrade expenses – and increasing their profits – with revenues from their new services.\textsuperscript{127}

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Los Angeles, CA</th>
<th>Adelphia is under heavy criticism in Los Angeles for its failure to deliver promised system upgrades.</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Monterey County, CA</td>
<td>The AT&amp;T/Comcast merger was rejected for failure to complete upgrades AT&amp;T promised to deliver when it was granted the franchise in 1998. AT&amp;T Broadband has been fined.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Oakland, CA</td>
<td>$10 million in damages sought for AT&amp;T’s failure to wire some parts of the city for basic cable services. AT&amp;T has stated that it may take a year or two to wire those residents, even though the original deadline was March 2001.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>San Francisco, CA</td>
<td>AT&amp;T started a five-year plan to upgrade networks throughout the region in 1998; AT&amp;T’s upgraded network passed only about 15 percent of homes through June 2002.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>San Jose, CA</td>
<td>The city has threatened to award its franchise to a competitor if AT&amp;T does not agree to upgrade the entire city for high-speed Internet access, which it has been extremely reluctant to do.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>San Jose, CA</td>
<td>Numerous towns in the area (including Sonoma County, Santa Rosa, Rohnert Park and Calistoga) have filed a joint suit against AT&amp;T for failure to upgrade its systems.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Location</td>
<td>Details</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>---------------------------</td>
<td>------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Vernon, CT</td>
<td>AT&amp;T was to have completed its upgrades for town schools by May 2001 but instead asked for an 18-month extension. AT&amp;T then ran out of money when only 25 percent of the upgrades had been completed.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Waterbury, CT</td>
<td>AT&amp;T agreed, in its franchise agreement, to build out service to a total of 110 miles. By June 2001, it was to have been extended by 80 miles, but only 24 miles were completed. AT&amp;T is seeking to alter the franchise agreement to upgrade instead of building out basic service.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>De Kalb County, GA</td>
<td>AT&amp;T Broadband failed to meet its upgrade schedule for De Kalb County, as well as providing poor service, and, as a result, the county denied AT&amp;T’s request to transfer control to AT&amp;T Comcast.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fayette County, GA</td>
<td>Began fining AT&amp;T Broadband $700/day in Apr. 2001 for failure to complete upgrades, which were to have been completed by Nov. 2000.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Peachtree City, GA</td>
<td>AT&amp;T was to have completed upgrades by Dec. 2001, but were pushed back to Mar. 2002. Customers have complained of hour-long waits to complain about poor reception and cable outages during the upgrades.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Clay County, FL</td>
<td>Recently increased the fines it can charge cable operators because there had been so many complaints about the quality of cable services, and AT&amp;T and other companies have postponed system upgrades for years.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fort Lauderdale, FL</td>
<td>Rejected a 10-year franchise agreement with AT&amp;T because of poor customer service and disagreements over whether AT&amp;T had promised to upgrade its systems there.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Martin County, FL</td>
<td>Adelphia has been accused of violating numerous provisions of its franchise agreement, including failing to upgrade systems on time and providing horrible customer service.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Miami, FL</td>
<td>Began fining AT&amp;T $2000/day on Sept. 1, 2001 for failure to complete upgrades on time. AT&amp;T estimated that the upgrade would be completed by Sept. 2002, at which time it would owe the city about $730,000 in fines.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dupage, IL</td>
<td>AT&amp;T was supposed to have completed upgrades two years ago but now states they will be completed by year end 2002.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tri-Cities (Chicago), IL</td>
<td>AT&amp;T has announced systems upgrades numerous times, but in each instance has backed away from its pledges. The cities are looking into creating their own cable company.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Boston, MA</td>
<td>AT&amp;T failed to meet deadlines for upgrading systems set forth in its franchise agreement. A compromise was reached under which AT&amp;T must complete upgrades by June 2003 or face fines of up to $1,000/day thereafter.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Boston, MA</td>
<td>Numerous towns in the Boston area (including Barnstable, Cambridge, New Bedford and Wellesley) denied AT&amp;T’s request to transfer control to AT&amp;T Comcast because AT&amp;T had failed to upgrade their systems and had provided poor customer service.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gardner, MA</td>
<td>AT&amp;T was to have completed its upgrades by Dec. 2001, but as of Sept. 2002, had not completed the project because it could not borrow the $6 million or $7 million because of the economy.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Massachusetts</td>
<td>AT&amp;T has said that it cannot afford to upgrade the systems in 39 towns in Massachusetts that were acquired from Cablevision.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Newmarket, NH</td>
<td>MediaOne had promised to complete upgrades by June 2001, but those plans were shelved after the AT&amp;T merger. AT&amp;T has announced that it will complete the upgrade, but local officials are doubtful that this will actually happen any time soon.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Clifton, NJ</td>
<td>Cablevision has come under harsh criticism for taking too long to upgrade its systems.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Washington County, OR</td>
<td>AT&amp;T was to have completed upgrades by year-end 2001 but could not and was given a six-month extension, after which, it will face a $100,000 fine plus $1,000/day in additional fines along with shortening of its franchise.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pittsburgh, PA</td>
<td>AT&amp;T Broadband admitted, in June 2002, that it could not complete the upgrades to the cable system by the end of June as promised. In fact, AT&amp;T Broadband, in May 2002, only 25 percent of the upgrade had been completed. AT&amp;T could face fines of $5,000/month until the upgrades are complete.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fairfax County, VA</td>
<td>In July 2002, Fairfax County officials voted to fine Cox $2,000/day and up to $2 million more for failure to complete promised upgrades to the county cable system.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Suffolk, VA</td>
<td>Charter has reneged on commitments it made in its franchise agreement, leading the city to fine Charter $255,000 for various violations, including failure to upgrade.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Sources: See Table Notes.
A NONCOMPETITIVE INDUSTRY STRUCTURE

ONLY WIRELINE COMPETITION RESULTS IN LOWER CABLE RATES

As discussed above, the only markets where cable prices have held steady, or simply not risen as fast, or in some cases fallen, are those in which cable operators face direct, wireline competition from overbuilders. The national statistics compiled by the FCC and summarized earlier do not fully convey the dramatic changes that have occurred in certain markets. See Table 8. In Dearborn, Michigan, for example, Comcast dropped prices from $33.95 to $21.95 per month for customers who expressed an interest in switching to WideOpenWest (WOW)\(^{128}\) In Kansas City, Time Warner offered customers discounts as deep as 45 percent to forestall defections to Everest Connections.\(^{129}\)

In some cases, cable’s attempts to lower prices in response to overbuilders have been so blatant that, in September 2002, the Department of Justice confirmed that it is investigating an unnamed cable company for predatory pricing practices.\(^{130}\) More recently, overbuilder WOW has filed a complaint with the FCC, alleging that Comcast is improperly targeting price reductions in the areas that WOW serves in Warren, Michigan.\(^{131}\) According to WOW, Comcast is attempting to negotiate private rates with select subscribers that are so low that “they wouldn’t be able to stay in business if everyone in the market got that deal.”\(^{132}\) The FCC is currently considering the complaint, and in the meantime, has put the cable industry “on notice” of its concerns.

In approving the AT&T/Comcast merger, the FCC found that cable operators “have the incentive and ability to target pricing in an anti-competitive manner,” and that AT&T and Comcast “may well have engaged in questionable marketing tactics and targeted discounts designed to eliminate MVPD competition.”\(^{133}\) While the cable operators argued that the practice of targeting pricing decreases enhances competition, the FCC found that such practices would instead “keep prices artificially high for consumers who do not have overbuilders operating in their areas because of the overbuilder’s inability to compete against an incumbent who uses such strategies.”\(^{134}\)
### Table 8. Overbuilders Force Cable Incumbents To Reduce Prices Sharply

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Company (Location)</th>
<th>Offered “minute-by-minute” short-term rate cuts to dissuade customers from switching to overbuilder Altrio after Altrio entered the market in November 2001.</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Adelphia (Los Angeles, CA)</td>
<td>Engaged in “bare knuckled” pricing wars with Knology, an overbuilder, until expanded basic service was offered for approximately $20 – well below the national average. Charter’s discounting was limited to areas in which it faced competition from Knology; expanded basic service in noncompetitive areas ranged to more than $35 per month for expanded basic service. Charter offered a cash payment of $200 and free installation to Knology customers.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Charter (West Point, GA)</td>
<td>Offers programming that costs Charter approximately $37 per month to Scottsboro customers for $20-$25 per month. Charter charges residents in nearby communities $72.90-$77.90 for the same services. Charter also offered Scottsboro Electric Power Board’s customers $200 to switch to Charter cable service and an additional $200 if they switched to Charter high-speed Internet service. (Scottsboro Electric Power Board operates a municipal cable system.)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Charter (Scottsboro, AL)</td>
<td>Offered Knology customers $300 to switch to Charter, as well as a “digital complete basic” service – including expanded basic programming, 50 digital channels and digital music channels – for less than $23 per month. Forgave customers’ debt incurred with Charter and other cable providers.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Charter (Montgomery, AL)</td>
<td>Discreetly offered Starpower customers win-back promotions (e.g., 64 movie channels for six months at no charge) and aggressively campaigned to keep potential Starpower customers.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Comcast (Montgomery County, MD)</td>
<td>Distributed fliers to residents of MDUs served by Starpower, offering discounts and free services (e.g., digital cable at less than $30 per month for three months, with two months of seven Starz! channels at no charge).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Comcast (Washington, DC)</td>
<td>Offered customers threatening to switch to WideOpenWest the Comcast digital package for $21.95 per month for six months, more than a 50 percent discount off regular rates.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Comcast (Warren, MI)</td>
<td>Shortly before RCN launched service, Comcast gave its representatives significant incentives to encourage customers to sign 18-month contracts, locking them into Comcast service, in exchange for lower cable rates. Comcast succeeded in signing up 80 percent of existing subscribers in Folcroft to long-term contracts.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Time Warner (New York, NY)</td>
<td>Adopted an aggressive bulk discount plan for apartment buildings targeted for service by RCN.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Time Warner (Lenexa, KS)</td>
<td>Offered MDU residents served by overbuilder a $60 package (standard service, three premium channels and high-speed Internet service) that is offered elsewhere in the Kansas City metropolitan area for $120. Also offered three months of service for the price of one month.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Time Warner (Overland Park, KS)</td>
<td>Offered MDU residents served by overbuilder an $80 package (standard service, three premium channels and high-speed Internet service), including three months free that is offered elsewhere in the Kansas City metropolitan area for $120.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Sources: See Table Notes.

Incumbent cable operators dominate the market. Approximately 6 percent of cable households nationwide are served by cable operators that face what the FCC defines as “effective competition” from non-satellite providers. Non-DBS wireless competitors, such as MMDS (a microwave wireless based cable system), and Home Satellite Dishes (HSD or C-band), and SMATV (private cable operators serving large residential complexes without using public rights-of-way), serve less than 4 percent of MVPD subscribers nationwide. Overbuilders hold only slightly more than 1 percent of the MVPD market, while incumbent cable operators control more than 76 percent of the market. DBS holds about 20 percent of the MVPD market. See Figure 5.
According to the FCC, “of the 33,246 cable community units nationwide, 671, or approximately 2 percent have been certified by the Commission as having effective competition as a result of consumers having a choice of more than one wireline MVPD.”\textsuperscript{137} Conversely, the rapid consolidation of cable operators since 1996 has clearly pushed prices up in the vast majority of markets where cable operators retain their monopoly. The 10 largest cable companies serve about 85 percent of all cable subscribers.\textsuperscript{138} The three largest cable companies today – Comcast, Time Warner and Charter – together serve approximately 56 percent of all cable subscribers.\textsuperscript{139} In 1996, by contrast, the three largest cable companies served only 48 percent of all cable subscribers.\textsuperscript{140} As the FCC has recently concluded, the market “continues to be highly concentrated.”\textsuperscript{141}

**INDUSTRY CONSOLIDATION HAS NOT LED TO COST SAVINGS FOR CONSUMERS**

The industry’s consolidation has been justified on the grounds that bigger companies would operate more efficiently and incur lower costs, which would translate into lower rates.\textsuperscript{142} Comparing rates across small and large cable systems, the FCC expected “to find lower average monthly rates due to increasing economies of scale.”\textsuperscript{143} But it found just the opposite – the larger the cable company, the higher its rates.\textsuperscript{144} Similarly, in the FCC’s most recent price report (2002), released in July 2003, the FCC also found that large cable systems have higher prices than medium or small cable systems.\textsuperscript{145}

The Consumer Federation of America and Consumer’s Union have reached the same conclusion: “[O]wnership of multiple systems by a single entity, large-size cable systems and clustering of cable systems all result in higher prices.”\textsuperscript{146} In their July 2000 study, the GAO
likewise found that “[c]able rates were slightly higher if the owner of a system in a particular franchise area was one of the larger national cable companies.”

In the cable industry, the costs of programming should be dropping – with consolidation, bargaining power continues to shift steadily toward cable operators and away from video programmers. For example, AT&T and Comcast argued that their merger would permit them to save between $250 million and $450 million a year on license fees negotiated with programming networks. Now that the merger is complete, Comcast has begun efforts to “squeeze” programming fees by insisting that the prices it pays for programming are reduced by 10 percent or more and are “going to drop channels to get this.” It remains to be seen if Comcast will pass any of these possible savings along to consumers.

Cable has been raising prices in spite of increasing scale for some time. The FCC finds that, as of July 2001, “operators with two or more systems, on average, had rates that were approximately 23 percent higher than single system operators.” Cable systems rated “large and very large” had the highest rates of all. In the 2002 FCC price report (released in July 2003), the trend towards higher cable prices in larger cable operators continues. For combined programming rates (basic and enhanced basic) and equipment charges, monthly rates for very large operators was $41.89, the rates for large operators was $41.20, the rates for medium operators was $40.26, the rates for small operators was $38.25, and the rates for very small operators were $31.86.

Figure 6: Large Cable Companies Charge More

![Figure 6: Large Cable Companies Charge More](attachment:B-3 (noncompetitive markets).)
DBS IS LIMITED AS A COMPETITOR AND DOES NOT REDUCE CABLE RATES

DBS now serves approximately 20 percent of all multichannel video programming subscribers. DBS holds out promise to be a serious competitor to cable. Up to now however, it has not been so. Even in areas where DBS has achieved significant penetration, “there is no measurable effect on . . . the price of cable service.”\textsuperscript{153} Consistent with this finding, the GAO also found that the provision of local broadcast channels by DBS companies has not led to lower cable prices.\textsuperscript{154} However, the GAO did find that where DBS companies provide local broadcast networks to their customers, cable operators provide more channels than in areas where DBS companies do not provide local broadcast channels. Presumably this is because the GAO “also found that DBS providers obtain a substantially higher level of subscribers in areas where they are providing local broadcast channels.”\textsuperscript{155}

Consumer groups have likewise concluded that “the presence of DBS has no statistically significant or substantial effect on cable prices, penetration or quality,” and that “[t]he higher the penetration of satellite, the higher the price of cable.”\textsuperscript{156} Even the cable industry’s own economic experts have acknowledged that “[t]he demand for cable is rather insensitive . . . to the DBS price,” which “indicate[s] that DBS is not a particularly good substitute for cable in the minds of consumers.”\textsuperscript{157}

Cable prices have continued to rise steadily over the last decade, even as DBS penetration has risen and prices have fallen.\textsuperscript{158} Churn rates for cable service – the measure of the extent to which consumers switch their providers – are extremely low, “just 1.3 percent per year during the past five years, suggesting that former cable customers make up less than one-third of DBS’s current customer base.”\textsuperscript{159} And most of the cable churn – “more than 95 percent” according to J.P. Morgan – “is caused by factors other than DBS competition.”\textsuperscript{160} Comcast, for its part, added approximately 57,000 new subscribers in the first quarter of 2003, reversing a prior year-over-year decline of 2.7 percent.\textsuperscript{161} For the second quarter of 2003, Comcast added another 12,100 basic subscribers.\textsuperscript{162}

Another sign that DBS is not an effective competitor to cable is the fact that it has had no impact on cable’s advertising revenues, which now constitute approximately 30 percent of total cable industry revenues.\textsuperscript{163} As an analyst at PricewaterhouseCoopers has recently noted, “[w]e don’t see any near-term to medium-term impact on local cable advertising” as a result of DBS, and over the long term, “cable will continue to dominate the market.”\textsuperscript{164} Cable’s share of ratings is instead “stronger than ever,” as “satellite has not caused one blip for cable.”\textsuperscript{165}

While DBS is adding subscribers more quickly than cable, this is unsurprising given their much later start in the market. Moreover, the major cable operators have been focusing more on profitability than on gross subscriber additions. As one industry analyst has explained, cable operators “are willing to sacrifice subscriber growth in exchange for higher revenue and cash flow growth.”\textsuperscript{166} This is not to say that the cable industry is unable or unwilling to attack satellite as a nettlesome competitor, particularly when the weapon of choice is government intervention. Recognizing satellite’s recent gains, an effort to impose
another level of taxation on satellite video services is underway in a number of states.167 If the cable industry is successful in this regard, it will drive up DBS provider costs and widen even further cable’s cost advantages over satellite.

The limited success of DBS in obtaining market share reflects the fact that DBS is popular primarily at the two edges of the market – in rural areas where there is no cable service at all168 and among the minority of consumers that are willing to pay stiff premiums to receive large numbers of sports channels.169 More than eight years after the introduction of DBS, approximately 20 to 30 percent of DBS subscribers still reside in the rural areas where cable service remains unavailable.170 DBS penetration remains heavily weighted in favor of rural markets, and the share of DBS’s customers from such markets actually increased in the period 2000-2002.171 See Table 9. Cable companies typically compare their digital tiers – and not their basic services – against satellite.172

Further, DBS can’t reach many urban customers who lack a direct line of sight to the southern sky,173 and dishes are often difficult to install in the multi-family dwelling units that house approximately 30 percent of the U.S. population and that are responsible for about 20-23 percent of cable revenues.174 DBS is still not able to offer local broadcast channels in many markets.175 One survey indicates that 47 percent of cable subscribers would not subscribe to satellite service for that reason alone.176

Table 9. Top 10 Satellite Markets By State (market penetration)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>State</th>
<th>Market Penetration</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Vermont</td>
<td>29.07 percent</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Montana</td>
<td>27.95 percent</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wyoming</td>
<td>25.09 percent</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Idaho</td>
<td>24.80 percent</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Utah</td>
<td>24.29 percent</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mississippi</td>
<td>23.48 percent</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Arkansas</td>
<td>22.85 percent</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Missouri</td>
<td>22.68 percent</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>North Dakota</td>
<td>20.95 percent</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Georgia</td>
<td>20.85 percent</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: See Table Notes

DBS is also unable to match cable company service bundles. DBS has been slow to provide efficient two-way high-speed Internet access services. The former broadband Internet partner of EchoStar, StarBand, filed for bankruptcy in May 2002.177 In the wake of the failure of the EchoStar/Hughes merger, DIRECTV announced that it was abandoning the resale of DSL service it had been offering in an attempt to compete with cable’s video/broadband bundle.178 It does, however, continue to offer two-way Internet service through its DirecWay brand.179 DBS also has no ability to provide telephony services,180 which cable companies now offer to at least 12 percent of all homes passed by their networks,181 and now serves 2,500,000 residential customers.182 In the meantime, cable companies may gain an advantage over DBS by bundling cable video services with telephone by reducing their prices for
customers that purchase cable broadband and telephony together with cable’s video offerings.¹⁸³

Despite a rising customer base, satellite’s 19 million subscribers are still less than the 20 to 21 million households now served by digital cable, and digital cable’s penetration is rising faster than satellite’s.¹⁸⁴ As cable operators upgrade to digital facilities, DBS loses the quality advantage it previously could offer to lure high-end subscribers. Digital cable facilities have now moved ahead of DBS in channel capacity and picture quality (cable systems, unlike satellite dishes, aren’t vulnerable to rain and snow) and are far better than satellite in providing broadband Internet service, voice telephone service, VOD service and all other interactive services. Analysts generally agree that digital cable has “competitive advantages over . . . direct-broadcast satellite,” and that DBS providers will “continue losing competitive ground” to cable companies.¹⁸⁵ Upgraded cable systems now give the cable industry “tangible competitive advantages over the DBS companies.”¹⁸⁶ Cable is now winning the majority of subscribers that sign up for digital service;¹⁸⁷ analysts expect cable to capture “most of the growth” in the video market over the next 10 years.¹⁸⁸
CABLE COMPANIES ABUSE THEIR MARKET POWER TO DEFEND THEIR MONOPOLY

For many years, regulators protected and favored cable on the theory that it was the only video distribution medium that could broadly challenge the (then dominant) over-the-air broadcasters and the lock they held on video content. Local broadcasters and the networks that fed them much of their content were so dominant that almost anything that was good for cable would be good for competition. Thus, local regulators didn’t hesitate to grant exclusive franchises to cable operators and were generally sympathetic to rules that barred various forms of non-cable competition, such as the satellite master antenna systems (SMATV) operated by some landlords to serve multi-tenant dwellings. A 1981 FCC study concluded that deregulating cable would promote much-needed competition in video programming.189

By 1984, however, it was apparent that cable had already superseded over-the-air broadcasting as the dominant distributor of video programming. In 1985, a federal appellate court struck down an exclusive franchise requirement on First Amendment grounds.190 By 1992, Congress had concluded that far from spurring competition, the 1984 Act had permitted cable companies to seize control of video markets, and use their market power to suppress competition by others.191 In the 1992 Cable Act, Congress therefore reversed course and declared that a franchising authority “may not unreasonably refuse to award an additional competitive franchise.”192

But cable operators have successfully used regulatory lobbying and a variety of pricing and other tactics to deter competitive entry and maintain their monopolies. The cable incumbents have let it be known that every competitive threat will be met “swiftly and forcefully.”193 For these reasons, magnified by capital cost of entry, exclusive franchising – de facto if not de jure – has remained the norm to this day. As discussed below, only a tiny fraction of markets are served by two or more cable systems.

A LONG HISTORY OF DISCRIMINATORY PRACTICES BASED ON PROGRAMMING

As cable operators grew and consolidated in the 1980s, they built up their own programming operations. Several bought production studios and film libraries. By 1988, cable operators had taken a minority equity interest in “virtually every new programming channel that has started in the past two years.”194 A year later, Congress would receive testimony that it was “almost impossible . . . to start a new cable system service without surrendering equity to the owners of the monopoly cable conduits.”195 By 1990, almost two-thirds of newly launched cable channels were affiliated with cable companies.196 By 1992, 10 of the 15 most popular (non-premium) cable networks were owned or controlled by cable companies.197 Cable companies controlled virtually all of the regional sports networks and four of the top five pay-movie services.198 TCI, then the largest owner of cable properties, had financial interests in CNN, TBS, TNT, Headline News, the Cartoon Network, the Learning Channel, the Discovery Channel, the Box, Cable Health Club, the Family Channel, BET, E!
By acquiring such dominant positions in the markets for video content, cable operators have put themselves in a position where they can easily block the development of competitive distribution media, such as overbuilders, satellite or new terrestrial wireless services. See Table 10. Congress has attempted to address these problems step-by-step but only in a piecemeal fashion and with mixed success.

The 1988 Satellite Home Viewer Act gave satellite providers a copyright license to retransmit broadcast network programming only to those customers who could not adequately receive broadcast signals over the air via traditional rooftop antennas.

In a related move to preempt new distribution media competition, almost every major cable company then joined a consortium – Primestar – that leased the only available medium-power satellite. The consortium then launched a satellite of its own, unequivocally signaling to all potential satellite competitors that the cable incumbents would use satellites themselves to crush satellite-based competition. The Department of Justice recognized this for what it was – a scheme to “block DBS entry by any other firm.”

In follow-up hearings in 1992, Congress concluded that cable operators were still using several different strategies to suppress competition in video markets. The companies refused to carry new channels that competed most directly with those in which the cable companies themselves owned equity interests. They also refused to sell their programming to competing distributors like satellite carriers or sold them on discriminatory terms calculated to suppress competition. Cable companies were using other coercive tactics to depress the value of independent video channels.

Accordingly, the 1992 Cable Act prohibited exclusive contracts between cable companies and affiliated satellite, cable and broadcast programmers, absent express FCC approval. These rules, sometime referred to as the “program-access” rules, require that any cable network programming that is at least in part owned by a cable operator and delivered by satellite must be made available to any other multichannel video competitor, whether it be an overbuilder or DBS company. (However, satellite-delivered programming can still be subject to exclusive contracts when the programmer and the cable operator are not affiliated.) The FCC’s rules were scheduled to end in October 2002, but the FCC decided to extend them for another five years. The FCC found that “marketplace evidence . . . tends to confirm that, where permitted, vertically integrated programmers will use foreclosure of programming to provide a competitive edge to their affiliated cable operators. The evidence suggests that the ability to foreclose vertically integrated programming is especially significant in the regional programming market, which is not covered by the program-access rules if the programming is distributed terrestrially. This type of programming has in fact been withdrawn from DBS competitors.” The cable industry has effectively exploited this “terrestrial” or non-satellite loophole by denying content to competitors when their affiliated programming is delivered terrestrially rather than by satellite.
Table 10. Maintaining the Monopoly through the Control of Programming

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Action Taken</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1990</td>
<td>Cable operators (TCI, Time Warner, MediaOne, Comcast, and Cox) form Primestar Partnership to “[d]o our best to keep core services off Hughes DBS to minimize long-term competitive bypass threat.”</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1990</td>
<td>In the 1990 Cable Report, FCC finds that cable had restricted wireless cable systems’ access to numerous channels (including HBO, ESPN, Showtime and TNT) and had charged between 36 and 70 percent more than cable operators were charged for access to these channels in the few instances that such access was granted.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1990</td>
<td>Turner Broadcasting and ESPN refuse to allow Glasgow, KY municipal cable system to carry programming from TNT and ESPN.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1993</td>
<td>Department of Justice and state attorneys general file antitrust suits against Primestar and its respective members, stating that the cable industry has engaged in “anti-competitive conduct with the effect of delaying, if not pre-empting, cable-competitive entry into DBS by imposition of unreasonable restraints on the availability of programming to DBS entrants.”</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1993</td>
<td>Viacom claims that TCI has used its dominant position as a cable company to impede competition in cable programming. The suit is dropped in 1995 after TCI agrees to purchase Viacom’s cable systems.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1998</td>
<td>DIRECTV files a complaint with the FCC against Comcast because Comcast will not grant access to Comcast Sportsnet as it is not satellite-delivered programming. EchoStar files a similar complaint in 1999.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1999</td>
<td>RCN files a complaint against Cablevision for refusing to provide RCN access to overflow sports programming that it carries on its “MetroChannels.”</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1998-1999</td>
<td>Seren Innovations, during the AT&amp;T-MediaOne merger proceedings, states that it is being denied access to the MidWest Sportschannel, the Game Show Network and MSNBC in the Minneapolis market due to exclusive contract arrangements between AT&amp;T and programmers.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2001</td>
<td>Everest has been unable to gain access to Time Warner’s Metro Sports channel (the Kansas City regional sports network) because it is accessed via a terrestrial feed. Everest also states that the Metro Sports channel is offered on Comcast’s Kansas systems through a terrestrial interconnection agreement with Time Warner.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2001</td>
<td>Qwest Broadband Services states that Cox “hold[s] exclusive cablecasting rights to a popular professional sports franchise in Phoenix [and] settled an antitrust complaint by agreeing to make the games available for display to competitive MVPDs. However, the incumbent has subsequently changed its terms and now demands a rate for such games that exceeds the rate for ESPN. Further, as a condition of carrying such games, the buyer must agree to carry Cox’s local cable origination channel full time.”</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2001</td>
<td>CT Communications Network, a video over DSL provider, states that “AT&amp;T is refusing to sell HITS to any company using DSL technology to deliver video services over existing phone lines because such companies would directly compete with AT&amp;T’s entry into the local telephone market using both its own cable systems and the cable plant of unaffiliated cable operators.”</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2001</td>
<td>Paul Bunyan, an Open Video System operator competing with Charter in numerous Minnesota markets, is denied access to the Disney Channel because Charter has an exclusive contract with Disney.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Sources: See Table Notes. (AT&T Purchased by Comcast Dec. 2002)
The 1992 Act also directed the FCC to adopt rules to prevent cable operators from requiring a financial interest in programming as a condition of carriage – to prohibit cable companies from “coercing” exclusive rights from a programmer and to forbid unreasonable discrimination in favor of affiliated programmers.208

Cable’s video-content abuses have triggered a series of antitrust actions as well. In a 1993 suit, Viacom accused TCI of impeding competition in cable programming.209 The suit was dropped in 1995 after TCI agreed to purchase Viacom’s cable systems.210 In 1993, the Department of Justice and more than 40 state attorneys general filed antitrust suits against some of the larger cable operators, alleging that the defendants engaged in a continuing agreement, combination and conspiracy to restrain competition in multichannel subscription TV service by forming Primestar to block other firms from entering the DBS business. The effect of the Primestar venture, the attorneys general claimed, had been to delay, if not prevent, entry into the DBS market through the restriction of access to programming owned or controlled by the venture’s companies to other DBS companies.211 These anti-competitive abuses are similar to those found by Congress.212 The Justice Department brought another action against TCI when it attempted to merge with Liberty Media. All of these actions culminated in consent decrees that limited, in varying degrees, cable’s right to discriminate in favor of affiliated video programmers or to deny programming to unaffiliated video distributors.213 See Table 11.

### Table 11. The Suppression of Cable Programming

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Source</th>
<th>Quote</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>New York Attorney General Robert Abrams (1993)</td>
<td>Cable TV’s “monopolistic practices” have made the public “captives of cable.” “Our investigation found that the cable industry used threats and intimidation to place itself as the gatekeeper in control of the price and distribution of virtually all subscription television programming.”</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tennessee Senator Al Gore (1992)</td>
<td>“The cable marketplace is choked to death because would-be competitors are prevented from being in the game. Any new programmer who comes into the cable business is going to be coughing up a share of his company (to cable operator) as the price of showing his wares to the public.”</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pennsylvania Attorney General Ernie Preate, Jr. (1993)</td>
<td>“For competitors to cable, such as satellite dishes or wireless cable, to be effective, they had to offer the most popular programming, such as HBO, CNN and ESPN . . . But when a programmer considered selling to cable competitors, the cable companies threatened to drop the channels from their systems.”</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Acting Assistant Attorney General, Antitrust Division, John Clark (1993)</td>
<td>“Without adequate programming, a service competitive with existing cable monopolies can’t get off the ground . . . Prime-Star’s formation made programming much more difficult to obtain, and deferred entry by others.”</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Sources: See Table Notes.
EXPLOITING THE NON-SATELLITE DISTRIBUTION LOOPHOLE

A decade ago, virtually all cable programming was distributed by satellite, and Congress thus made reference to “satellite cable programming” in the 1992 Act’s program-access provisions of the new law. The 1992 Act’s program-access provisions, as noted above, left open a significant loophole that cable operators are now exploiting aggressively. For example, fiber-optic cable is now readily available to move local sports events from the stadium to the cable company’s local head-end, and with no satellite in the loop, cable operators are once again able to monopolize key programming to suppress competition by competing video distributors. A federal appellate court recently accepted that a cable incumbent could therefore avoid the program access requirements by moving programming from satellite to terrestrial delivery. This form of delivery has been developed on a national scale.

How the Loophole Works on a National Scale

Incumbent cable operators can now replicate the regional non-satellite loophole on a national scale by using a new terrestrial-based national fiber network. In an effort to undermine the federal program-access requirements, Jerry Kent, President and CEO of Sequel III, teamed with Corves Corporation in February 2003 to purchase the assets of high-speed data and telecom provider Broadwing Communications for $129.3 million. Broadwing has an intelligent optical-switched network, reaching 150 markets. Kent has said his decision to buy an optical network with a national footprint could help operators avoid federal program-access laws: “The cable industry can develop its own programming and deliver it via our Broadwing network and take programming exclusivity.”

Broadwing has 18,700 miles of interconnected fiber covering over 130 U.S. major markets and overlays much of the top four cable providers’ major clusters. Cable operators have been distributing exclusive, regional content over metro fiber rings; Broadwing expands this tactic to a nationwide footprint. Broadwing’s network clusters, as of July 2002, overlay a minimum of 15 out of the top 25 cable clusters in the continental United States, served by Comcast, Cox and Time Warner Cable, based on 2000 year-end data.

How the Loophole Works on a Local Scale

In the New York area, Cablevision has obtained control of seven of the nine local professional sports teams, and it denies overbuilder RCN access, not only to the event being aired but even to the overflow programming (games not featured on the Madison Square Garden network) when more than one of the seven teams is playing simultaneously. These programs are delivered terrestrially and hence subject to the non-satellite loophole. By contrast, Cablevision did give RCN access to the same sports channels for distribution in New Jersey, where Cablevision doesn’t compete. Comcast threatened to use similar tactics in Philadelphia but backed off when the Department of Justice began a review of Comcast’s proposed acquisition of Home Team Sports in Washington. Seren Innovations, an
overbuilder in Minneapolis, encountered similar problems with AT&T. The list of cable competitors running into similar difficulties is now growing rapidly. See Table 12.

Table 12. Maintaining the Monopoly by Limiting Access to Regional Networks

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Company</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>AT&amp;T</td>
<td>During the review of the AT&amp;T-MediaOne merger, Seren Innovations, an overbuilder in Minneapolis, had raised issues regarding access to AT&amp;T’s exclusive contract to carry lucrative sports programming in Minnesota. AT&amp;T had promised, in response, to reach a reasonable accommodation. But after the merger was approved, AT&amp;T simply reasserted its exclusivity rights to this programming.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AT&amp;T</td>
<td>CT Communications Network (CTCN), a subsidiary of Champaign Telephone is testing providing video service over DSL lines in its ILEC (incumbent local exchange carrier) territory. AT&amp;T has refused to provide CTCN with its HITS transport service. CTCN stated that “AT&amp;T is refusing to sell HITS to any company using DSL technology to deliver video services over existing phone lines because such companies would directly compete with AT&amp;T’s entry into the local telephone market using both its own cable systems and the cable plant of unaffiliated cable operators.”</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AT&amp;T</td>
<td>Braintree Electric Light Department (BELD) has been denied access to the New England Cable News network because it is AT&amp;T-owned and provisioned via a terrestrial feed.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cablevision</td>
<td>In New York, Cablevision has obtained control of programming for seven of the nine local professional sports teams; it denies overbuilder RCN access to overflow programming when more than one of the seven teams is playing simultaneously.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Comcast</td>
<td>In Philadelphia, Comcast threatened to deny RCN long-term access to local sports programming and backed off only when the Department of Justice began a review of Comcast’s proposed acquisition of Home Team Sports in Washington. And while multi-year programming contracts are standard in the industry, Comcast still won’t sign any contract with RCN that runs longer than three months.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cox</td>
<td>Qwest Broadband Services states that Cox, “holding exclusive cablecasting rights to a popular professional sports franchise in Phoenix, settled an antitrust complaint by agreeing to make the games available for display to competitive MVPDs. However, the incumbent has subsequently changed its terms and now demands a rate for such games that exceeds the rate for ESPN. Further, as a condition of carrying such games, the buyer must agree to carry Cox’s local cable origination channel full time.”</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Time Warner</td>
<td>Everest Connections, in Kansas City, KS, has been unable to gain access to the Time Warner’s Metro Sports (the Kansas City regional sports network) channel because it is accessed via a terrestrial feed. The Metro Sports channel is offered on Comcast’s Kansas systems through a terrestrial interconnection agreement with Time Warner.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Sources: See Table Notes  (AT&T purchased by Comcast in Dec. 2002)

Local programming – especially sports programming – is crucial in the video distribution market. RCN estimates that it will lose half or more subscribers without it, pushing subscription rates “so low that no entrepreneur would be willing to risk the hundreds of millions of dollars required to overbuild an urban area with a modern fiber optic plant.” In the Philadelphia area, DBS subscription rates are less than half the national average for the
top 20 cities (other than Philadelphia), where Comcast has refused to license its regional sports network to competing DBS providers.222 Cable clearly recognizes the importance of local programming – in particular local sports.

As the FCC found in its 2001 report, 86 percent of “must have”223 regional sports programming is vertically integrated.224 In its 2002 report, the FCC recognized the concerns of emerging competitors that, “despite the presence of the program access rules, lack of access to programming, especially sports programming, remains a significant barrier to entry and an impediment to the successful development of a competitive MVPD business.”225 While national sports programming is dominated by ESPN, regional sports distribution is dominated by Fox Sports Net, which owns 60 percent of all regional sports networks and is jointly owned by the sixth largest cable operator, Cablevision, and News Corp.226 Indeed, local programming in general is “significantly more vertically integrated than national programming services.”227

To date, attempts to close the non-satellite distribution loophole have been singularly unsuccessful. In Los Angeles, both the cable industry228 and the motion picture industry229 have vehemently opposed adoption of a local program-access ordinance that would address the deficiencies in federal law. This opposition comes in the face of a city attorney opinion confirming that Los Angeles has the right to adopt such an ordinance230 and city council direction that a local program access ordinance be drafted.231 Nonetheless, the cable industry has been able to thwart such action.

Correcting the deficiencies in the current program-access rules will take congressional action – action that is now long overdue.232 Congress must act to close the loopholes through which the major cable operators continue to distort the video-programming market and maintain their dominance in the provision of video programming to consumers.

A CASE STUDY OF CABLE LEVERAGE OVER INDEPENDENT PROGRAMMERS: CABLEVISION AND THE YANKEES

The recent situation regarding carriage of the Yankees Entertainment and Sports Network, LLC (“YES”) in the New York City region illustrates what happens when a relatively powerful and large incumbent cable operator – Cablevision – collides with an independent content provider that controls decisional sports programming. The YES Network is currently aired throughout parts of New York, Connecticut, New Jersey and Pennsylvania.

Cablevision is the nation’s sixth largest cable operator.233 It currently operates the nation’s single largest cable cluster, serving 3 million households in the New York metropolitan area.234 Cablevision owns Madison Square Garden and its teams, the Knicks, Rangers and the WNBA Liberty.235 In addition, Cablevision’s programming arm, Rainbow, is a 50 percent partner in Fox Sports Net and owns five regional sports channels outside of the New York market.236 Cablevision has also recently announced its interest in acting as a partner in the purchase of Vivendi’s U.S. entertainment businesses, including Universal
Studios, Universal Music and the USA and Sci-Fi cable channels.\textsuperscript{237} It also has stated it intention to start a DBS system in the fall of 2003.\textsuperscript{238}

Cablevision held the cable rights to the Yankees in its subscriber footprint for several years through the 2001 season.\textsuperscript{239} Thereafter, the YES network was established and now controls the rights to air the Yankees on both cable and satellite in the New York area. YES was asking cable operators to pay approximately $2.00 per subscriber and was requiring that YES be placed on the cable-programming tier (enhanced basic), as opposed to a more expensive digital tier or as a pay channel. Cablevision refused, saying that the programming costs were high and that it would air YES as a separate pay channel for those subscribers who wanted to pay for it.\textsuperscript{240} In other words, YES preferred that the Yankees be aired at no extra cost to most subscribers. Cablevision argued that those who did not want to see the Yankees should not have to bear possibly higher subscriber costs, even though Cablevision carried the Yankees without extra charge in prior years when they had held Yankee rights. Moreover, while Cablevision wanted to carry the Yankees on its digital tier (costing additional subscriber fees for most consumers), it intended to keep its own sports programming on the expanded basic tier. In contrast, competing cable overbuilder RCN had agreed to carry Yankees games without additional charge to subscribers, as did neighboring New York cable incumbent, Time Warner.\textsuperscript{241}

A very high profile standoff between Cablevision and YES followed, with all parties taking losses – Yankee fans most of all. Cablevision subscribers did not see Yankee games for the entire 2002 season. This loss angered many New Yorkers, who switched from Cablevision to overbuilder RCN or satellite services. YES estimates that Cablevision lost as many as 40,000 subscribers in the first two months of the standoff alone; Cablevision says it was only 5,400 subscribers.\textsuperscript{242} At the same time, the standoff cost the YES network vital distribution in its first year of operation.

The standoff ended only hours before the 2003 opening game, after extensive and repeated mediation efforts first by New York City’s mayor and finally by New York State’s attorney general, as well as by proposals introduced in state legislatures in both New Jersey and New York to enact program-access legislation. The deal allowed Cablevision to keep YES off its enhanced basic cable programming tiers and offer it as part of a special-pay sports tier, which includes two other Cablevision-owned sports networks, for $4.95 per month. Alternatively, subscribers could choose to pay $1.95 per month to purchase YES alone.\textsuperscript{243} The deal helps Cablevision draw subscribers to its more lucrative digital tier and gain profits by selling new digital set-top boxes. Consumers will now have to pay an additional $3.24 per set box. That means if a consumer has three television sets, the cost will be an additional $13.62 per month for set top boxes.\textsuperscript{244}

Although many sports fans were enormously frustrated and inconvenienced by Cablevision’s refusal to carry YES, the ultimate resolution of this dispute appears positive for consumers in at least two respects: \textit{first}, Cablevision customers who want to watch the Yankees now have multiple choices for doing so, whether by subscribing to a premium tier (the new all-sports tier) or by buying YES on an \textit{à la carte} basis; and \textit{second}, and most
importantly, by preventing Cablevision from discriminating against YES in favor of its own sports networks to the competitive detriment of an independent programmer by placing each network on the same tier. Of course, due to Cablevision’s insistence, subscribers will pay an additional charge above their cable-programming tier to view the Yankees, where previously the Yankees were aired as part of the cable programming tier at no additional cost.

Subsequent to the Cablevision – YES resolution, Time Warner announced that effective July 29, 2003, that it would permit New York-area customers to choose not to receive the YES network and reduce their bill by $1.00. This was viewed by YES as a breach of its agreement with Time Warner who called the decision “unfair and discriminatory” and further stated “Time Warner was treating YES differently from the way it treats channels owned by its parent company AOL.”

Cablevision’s refusal to carry YES is an industry strategy not limited to New York. Taking a page from the Cablevision playbook, Time Warner ceased carriage of the Sunshine Network in Florida in January 2003. In pulling the Sunshine Network, Time Warner blacked out the NBA’s Miami Heat and Orlando Magic, the NHL’s Tampa Bay Lightning, and the Florida State Seminoles and University of Florida Gators sports for its Sunshine State customers. Instead of continued carriage, Time Warner offered the Sunshine Network an unwanted à la carte arrangement. Only after a 71-day standoff did Time Warner return the Sunshine Network and its popular sports programming to the air.

In the aftermath of the YES battle, Cablevision has proposed in testimony before the United States Senate that independent programmers be prohibited from distributing programming conditioned on the cable operator placing such programming on a specified cable tier or pay channel. The problem with this proposal is that it gives further power to cable operators at the expense of independent programmers. As we have seen, Cablevision was able to keep YES off the air for quite some time, and, achieved its objective of keeping YES off its expanded basic programming tier.

Moreover, nothing in Cablevision’s proposal prevents a cable operator from placing competitor programming on more expensive and less-watched tiers, while placing programming they own or control on the most widely viewed tiers, or any other tiering configuration that suits their interests. Thus, the proposal would have negative impacts on independent programmers.

While Cablevision’s re-tiering proposal is anti-competitive and anti-consumer, a true à la carte regime would be both pro-competition and pro-consumer. Consumers should be able to choose their own suite of programming, rather than being force-fed the programming “tiers” that cable operators want them to purchase. This is true consumer choice. Offering à la carte programming is good for consumers, as long as such programming is offered in a fair and nondiscriminatory manner.

À la carte programming is fiercely opposed by most cable networks, including powerful programmers such as ESPN, and is often prohibited by contract. Recently Liberty
Media Corp. Chairman John Malone used his appearance during an annual conference for investors to wade into the escalating debate over à la carte pricing of cable programming. In his remarks, Mr. Malone said à la carte pricing would jeopardize ESPN's business model. “End of story. End of Disney,” he told investors, adding that in retrospect he wishes he had imposed à la carte pricing on ESPN, and set an industry standard, when he had a contractual window to do so as the head of TCI Cable in the mid-1990s, before he sold to AT&T.250 Recently, the American Cable Association (ACA), the trade association representing small and mid-sized independent cable operators, has argued that à la carte pricing will allow “small systems to control sky rocketing program costs and that if programmers don’t voluntarily agree to such packaging, the government should step in.”251

ENLISTING REGULATORS

As noted earlier, cable operators historically enjoyed an exclusive franchise – direct competition was either expressly barred, or effectively barred, by local licensing policies that made entry by a second player extremely difficult. By the 1980s, exclusivity had become the almost universal,252 though often unwritten, practice. In urban markets, cable waged lengthy battles against SMATV that landlords attempted to operate as competitive cable networks for apartment buildings.253

Although exclusive franchise laws are no longer expressly on the books, cable operators have nevertheless been remarkably successful in enlisting the help of regulators to limit direct competition by overbuilders. And where cable does not get its way, there is little hesitation to haul the local franchising authority into court.254

Until 1996, phone companies were barred from providing cable video services by a series of decrees,255 FCC regulations256 and federal statutes.257 See Table 13. By 1992, the FCC was formally recommending that Congress repeal the ban.258 The Department of Justice reached a similar conclusion,259 as did the National Telecommunications and Information Administration (NTIA).260 In 1996, Congress finally did so.261
Table 13. Maintaining the Monopoly through Regulation

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Regulation</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1956</td>
<td><em>United States v. Western Elec.</em> (D.N.J.): Telephone companies were prohibited from offering anything other than rate-regulated “common carrier” services, and the FCC had ruled in Frontier Broadcasting Co. that cable providers are not “common carriers” because they determine the content of what is being communicated.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1968</td>
<td><em>FCC</em>: Telephone companies could not construct or operate cable TV facilities or provide common carrier channel services to local cable TV operators without first obtaining FCC permission.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1970</td>
<td><em>FCC</em>: Telephone companies were prohibited from providing “cable television service to the viewing public in its telephone area,” either “directly or indirectly through an affiliate.” 47 C.F.R. § 64.601(a) (1970)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1982</td>
<td><em>United States v. AT&amp;T</em> (D.C. Cir.): The Justice Department viewed cable television as an “information service” within the meaning of the decree. While this restriction was removed in its entirety in late 1991, the decree’s inter-LATA restriction prohibited Bell company provision of video services.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1984</td>
<td>Section 613(b) of the 1984 Cable Act codified the FCC’s 1970 cross-ownership restrictions. “It shall be unlawful for any common carrier . . . to provide video programming directly to subscribers in its telephone service area, either directly or indirectly through an affiliate owned by, operated by, controlled by or under common control with the common carrier.” 47 U.S.C. § 533(b)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Sources: See Table Notes.

Cable incumbents have encouraged many local regulators to enact “level playing field” laws that typically require new entrants to build-out their networks to serve the entire market. These local regulations sharply raise entry barriers – the exact opposite of the policy that Congress has required to promote competitive entry into multichannel video markets.

According to overbuilders, cable operators also routinely interfere with the cable-franchise process itself. For example, RCN has claimed that Comcast’s “interference with its local franchise negotiations in Prince George’s County, Maryland, and in Philadelphia, Pennsylvania, kept RCN from securing a cable franchise.”

Elsewhere, cable incumbents have successfully lobbied to require competitors to contribute to the subsidy of “public, educational and government” channels not in proportion to their relative market share but rather, dollar for dollar with the incumbents. These, and other similar demands that the incumbents make of local regulators, have been backed by threats of litigation if any competitor is allowed to enter on terms less burdensome than those imposed on the monopolist incumbent.

Similarly, at the federal level, cable has backed Congress in imposing even more onerous must-carry obligations on satellite providers than it has imposed on cable. If a DBS operator delivers even a single local broadcast signal in a market, it must carry all of them. The must-carry obligation for cable, by contrast, recognizes a channel-capacity limit. Satellite starts out at a substantial disadvantage in this regard, because a single satellite beam covers a
substantial fraction of the continent. There are approximately 1,650 television stations within the 210 Nielsen Designated Market Areas (DMAs) – an average of eight per market, with some markets having up to 24. There are thus many more local stations than there are available channels on the geostationary satellites used for DBS operations. The problem can be solved, up to a point, using “spot beams” from the satellite that direct local stations to smaller clusters of local markets, but there are still definite limits to how far spot-beam fixes can be pushed.

The cable incumbents have been particularly aggressive in their efforts to limit competition in apartment buildings and other multiple dwelling units. They have asked many landlords to sign “easement agreements.” These agreements purport to comply with FCC rules that give building owners the freedom to replace the incumbent with an overbuilder but actually have the opposite effect. As one overbuilder has noted, landlords that have signed these agreements now fear the threat of contract litigation “if they allow a competitor onto their property” and are therefore not invoking the FCC’s rules. The incumbents have also signed “exclusive marketing agreements” with landlords that reward the landlords generously for giving the incumbent operator exclusive access to the premises. The aggressive marketing of these agreements begins as soon as a competitor announces its plans to enter the market. See Table 14.

| Table 14. Maintaining the Monopoly through Access to Multiple Dwelling Units (MDU) |
|---------------------------------|-----------------------------------------------|
| Comcast (Indianapolis, IN)      | Less than one month after a cable franchise was awarded to TOTALink, Comcast sent out a mass mailing to property owners and management companies controlling MDUs, attaching a new 15-year exclusive service agreement for the owners and managers to sign immediately. In conjunction, Comcast offered to pay $75 for each resident apartment covered under the agreement. |
| Comcast (Washington, DC)        | Starpower has encountered numerous instances of MDUs where Comcast has received exclusive building rights for a number of years. |
| Comcast (Washington, DC)        | Distributed fliers to residents of MDUs served by Starpower, offering discounts and free services (e.g., digital cable at less than $30 per month, for three months, with two months of seven Starz! channels at no charge). |
| Comcast and Time Warner (Kansas City, KS) | Offered MDU property owners highly profitable revenue sharing agreements only after it became apparent that a competitive MDU provider would soon be offering service in the area. |
| Time Warner (Charlotte, NC)     | Carolina BroadBand surveyed owners and managers of MDUs in Charlotte, NC, and found that 80 percent of the units surveyed there had committed to a long-term exclusive agreement with Time Warner. |
| Time Warner (Lenexa, KS)        | Offered MDU residents a $60 package that is offered elsewhere in the Kansas City metropolitan area for $120. Time Warner also offered three months of service for the price of one month. |
| Time Warner (Overland Park, KS) | Offered MDU residents an $80 package (including three months free) that is offered elsewhere in the Kansas City metropolitan area for $120. |

Sources: See Table Notes.
**CABLE OPERATORS HAVE SUCCESSFULLY UNDERMINED THE LEASED-ACCESS PROVISION OF THE CABLE ACT**

Federal law requires cable operators to set aside up to 15 percent of their channel capacity so that unaffiliated programmers may offer competing service packages to consumers. As Congress envisioned it, the purpose of this requirement “is to promote competition in the delivery of diverse sources of video programming and to assure that the widest possible diversity of information sources are made available to the public.” The cable industry has successfully undermined this mandate and thwarted congressional intent.

The industry’s strategy has been a simple one: Cause the FCC, which has authority to regulate the prices for leased access, to adopt a methodology that sanctions a per-channel rate that essentially no competing programmer could pay and remain commercially viable. The FCC’s action in this regard is particularly troubling and stands in stark contrast to its commitment to viable intramodal competition in the telecommunications sector. In addition, further undermining congressional intent, the FCC has prohibited programmers seeking to utilize the leased-access provision of the Act for the purpose of providing a competitive Internet access service from doing so.

By undermining the Act’s leased access mandate, cable operators have also “limit[ed] the availability of diverse local minority programming and allow[ed] for potential discrimination against individual speakers or specific points of view.” For this reason, the United States Conference of Mayors is calling on the FCC to act to ensure reasonable rates for independent programmers who desire to utilize leased access from cable networks. The most effective way for the FCC to accomplish this would be to set rates for channels that cable operators are required to make available pursuant to the leased-access provision of the Cable Act via its existing unbundled network element pricing methodology.
EXTENDING THE CABLE MONOPOLY TO OTHER MARKETS AND PRODUCTS

DOMINATING BROADBAND INTERNET SERVICE

Cable operators now dominate the broadband Internet market, constituting a huge new source of earnings. Since the Internet is now present in approximately 60 percent of American homes, consumer expectations about availability and speed of Internet access have changed. Many Americans, once content with dial-up connections with slow speeds, have now demanded always-on connections at higher speeds. Hence “broadband Internet” service through a digital “cable modem” has now become an enormous and unanticipated new profit center for the cable industry. According to the FCC’s latest national broadband data, “[a]t the end of 2002, the number of high-speed lines connecting homes and businesses to the Internet was nearly 20 million compared to 2.8 million at the end of 1999.” This trend is only expected to continue, with the majority of this growth captured by broadband cable providers.

Cable operators have been bringing coaxial cable into homes for decades. Once the World Wide Web exploded into daily lives, cable operators quickly realized that they could allocate merely a small part of the bandwidth on the coaxial cable and offer an always-on connection with much higher speeds than dial-up. The only potential competitors in this market were local telephone companies who offered digital subscriber lines (DSL) with similar service to broadband Internet service offered by cable operators. However, cable operators had a much easier time implementing their service than the phone companies had with DSL service.

Phone companies currently are required to market DSL as a common carrier (meaning their lines are open to other competitors). Cable operators are not common carriers. As a result, even as phone companies have recently announced price discounts for DSL, cable now overwhelmingly leads the broadband Internet market. Cable franchises either provide Internet connectivity themselves or select a proprietary Internet service provider (ISP) pursuant to contract to offer service over their networks, such as EarthLink or AOL. However, most of the cable industry charges extra for using an ISP other than the provider of the cable modem service.

Both cable and phone companies (particularly the Bell companies) are vigorously advocating deregulation of their broadband services. The regulatory status of cable modems is currently unsettled, with the FCC having ruled them to be an interstate “information service” – and hence subject to virtually no regulation – but various federal courts have taken a different view. The FCC’s ruling is now being reviewed by a federal appellate court, and a decision in the matter is imminent. Because cable’s broadband services are essentially deregulated, the Bell companies are demanding similar treatment and release from their common carrier obligations. But deregulation of broadband Internet services is precisely the wrong answer and would result in no less deleterious consequences than has deregulation of cable’s video offerings. Phone companies should continue to be required to
offer DSL on a common carrier basis as a telecommunications service, and cable modem service should also be defined as a telecommunications service and thus available to all requesting customers on a common carrier basis.

Moreover, cable can promote tie-in arrangements that offer video and broadband Internet service together in packages, while DSL providers cannot. Recently, Consumers Union and Consumer Federation of America asked the Federal Trade Commission and the Justice Department to investigate such tie-in arrangements as a potential antitrust violation. Mark Cooper, research director of CFA stated, “[I]f there was ever a candidate for an investigation of predatory pricing under the anti-trust laws, this would be it. Even if the government concludes that the price is not predatory in the classic sense, it must be deeply concerned about anti-competitive tie-in.”

Cable’s first attempt, in 1995, to dominate the broadband Internet sector with Excite@Home ended in bankruptcy (see below). However, the broadband Internet business is now surging, and cable operator are currently estimated to control almost 60 percent of the business. The largest cable operators are expected to see their Internet subscriber growth double by 2005. Cable moved quickly into this area after upgrading much of its service to fiber optics, initially as a means of distinguishing itself from DBS. DBS hasn’t perfected its broadband technology as of yet and to date only offers limited forms of the service. Cable now has more than twice as many residential subscribers as DSL, with about 10.4 percent of residences using cable modems and 4.6 percent using DSL. The FCC’s latest broadband data shows cable modems with 11.4 million subscribers (57.3 percent) versus 6.5 million subscribers (32.7 percent) for DSL.

Comcast, the largest cable company in the nation, has become the largest provider of broadband services. Comcast Chief Executive Officer Brian Roberts stated that he predicts that by the end of 2003, his company will have five million broadband Internet customers. That would make it the third largest Internet provider in the country of any kind – tied with EarthLink, following AOL and MSN. As Roberts stated, “High-speed data is now the hottest property we have,” with the product growing by 40 percent a year. On May 8, 2003, Comcast announced that it added 417,000 broadband Internet subscribers in the first quarter of 2003 alone, and that “it expects to add 1.6 million high-speed Internet subscribers this year, a 33 percent increase from the number in 2002.” Comcast’s dominance was further confirmed when it released its second quarter results on July 31. In the second quarter, Comcast added another 350,900 broadband Internet subscribers, for a current total of 4.4 million subscribers, and reaffirmed its target of 1.6 million additions in 2003. From a financial perspective, Comcast’s revenue from these services increased 56.6 percent (to $548 million) from second quarter 2002.

As regulators and cable operators have both recognized, video services can now be distributed via broadband digital connections to the Internet. Cable’s dominance in broadband has created concern that it may stifle development of competing streaming video technologies, limit access to Internet sites and other content, or steer home shopping activities in favor of their proprietary interests.
The hardware and software to deliver streaming video over the Internet are already available, and every advance in bandwidth and compression technology makes video distribution over the Internet more feasible. A growing number of TV and radio stations are already being widely distributed over the Internet, albeit slowly and with variable quality.

On March 17, 2003, Yahoo! Inc. “unveiled its newest subscription service, Yahoo! Platinum, a premium online video and audio service featuring branded programming from leading entertainment, sports and news providers for both broadband and narrowband consumers. The new subscription service provides premium video and audio content from CBS’ Survivor Insider, Fox’s ‘American Idol,’ NASCAR.com, CBS Sports’ coverage of the NCAA Division I Men’s Basketball Championship through its Internet rights holder SportsLine.com, ABC News, CBS MarketWatch and The Weather Channel, among other providers. In coming weeks, Yahoo! Platinum plans to add programming from CNBC Dow Jones Business Video, National Geographic, Warren Miller Entertainment and much more.

With the launch of Yahoo! Platinum, Yahoo! continues to deliver on its strategy to be the most compelling entertainment, sports and news destination on the Web.”

Countless other providers are now providing broadcast-like audio and video services via the Web. One study reports that 35 percent of Americans, more than 80 million people, have tried streaming audio or video, up from 30 percent in 2000.

These developments threaten the cable incumbents at two levels. They lose control over creators of video content because it is so easy to link servers of digital video content to the Web. And they lose subscriber fees, pay-per-view revenues and general market share as a cornucopia of new video content comes on line. Advertising and pay-per-view revenues are directly threatened by Internet capabilities. Cable operators are also potentially threatened as the broadband Internet creates new content and potentially competing distribution outlets. Economists have noted, “…the Internet is the next potential source of widespread competition to cable television in the distribution of video programming.”

The cable industry initially responded by deliberately crippling the software that makes Internet-delivered streaming video possible – the industry boldly announced a limit on the technical capabilities of streaming video software used over cable facilities. At that time, major cable operators were joint owners of a company called @Home, to which they had assigned the power to administer the delivery of all broadband digital data services over the cable networks owned by those operators. @Home simply told its cable subscribers that they were not permitted to stream more than 10 minutes of video through their cable modems. Time Warner imposed an identical restriction on companies seeking to provide content over its Road Runner service.

This was too brazen even for cable, and the 10-minute restrictions have since been dropped. Time Warner abandoned its limit as part of its Memorandum of Understanding when it merged with AOL. AT&T committed to allow video streaming in the MediaOne merger proceeding.
This has not stopped cable, however, from attempting to undermine the migration of competing programming content to the Internet. See Table 15. Several cable operators have once again “started adding language to their programming contracts that limits the amount of streaming a network can offer via the Internet.” Other cable companies have apparently opted instead to condition the carriage of a video channel on the provider’s agreement not to distribute the same content over the Internet at all. Yet another approach now under active consideration, according to the trade press, is to impose “speed tiers” and “bandwidth-usage” fees “because of the potential threat posed by providers of Internet-based telephony and video-on-demand services that want to distribute their offerings over high-speed cable connections. MSOs fear that broadband service providers might end up competing with them by using cable’s very own fat pipes.” AT&T Broadband introduced tiered pricing to serve “power users” who “set up home networks, send or receive large files, such as when downloading software, or enjoy other bandwidth-intensive applications.”

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1996 - present</td>
<td>Cable operators begin providing broadband service over cable lines but severely limit the amount of bandwidth available for the broadband service. Economists have noted that the “typical cable system has a capacity of 744 MHz but only 6 MHz goes to broadband.”</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1998</td>
<td>Cable operators, through their broadband subsidiaries (Road Runner and @Home), impose a 10-minute limit on streaming video over cable broadband connections.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2001</td>
<td>Charter and other cable operators attempt to condition the carriage of non-affiliated programming on their systems through the programmer’s consent not to distribute the same content over the Internet.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2002</td>
<td>Press reports indicate that the incumbents have once again “started adding language to their programming contracts that limits the amount of streaming a network can offer via the Internet.”</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2002</td>
<td>AT&amp;T Broadband introduces tiered pricing to serve “power users” who “set up home networks, send or receive large files such as when downloading software, or enjoy other bandwidth-intensive applications.”</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2002</td>
<td>Other cable operators are considering imposing consumption or bandwidth-usage fees because of the threat of distribution of video programming content over high-speed cable connections.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Sources: See Table Notes. (AT&T purchased by Comcast Dec. 2002)

The concern that cable will deny consumers access to competitively supplied Internet-delivered content has become so acute in recent months that a broad coalition of content providers – including Amazon, Yahoo!, Walt Disney, eBay, Microsoft and Apple – have asked the FCC to take steps to ensure that cable operators do not “encumber the relationships . . . between their customers and destinations on the network.” As Amazon has explained, the reason for the rising concern is that the broadband world is “much more hospitable than
the present environment to discriminatory behavior.\(^{307}\) The cable industry has responded by offering subscribers unrestricted access to Internet content but refusing to agree to any rules that would enforce such practices.\(^{308}\)

Finally, there has been cable operators’ straightforward decision to limit digital bandwidth altogether. Cable operators have been deploying coaxial cable for as long as they have been offering cable service. Coaxial has much more capacity than the twisted-pair copper wires that phone companies have traditionally deployed to carry voice, yet cable’s broadband Internet service is, for the most part, no faster than telephone-company DSL service. This is because though coaxial cable can carry more than a hundred video channels, cable operators have opted to use only two of those channels (one for downstream traffic, another for upstream) for cable modem service.\(^{309}\) Upgraded cable systems – i.e., those that are capable of providing cable Internet service – typically have a bandwidth of between 550 and 750 MHz. Most systems are now at the higher level. As economists George Bittlingmayer and Tom Hazlett have noted, “cable systems could increase broadband access speeds by allocating more spectrum.”\(^{310}\) In fact, overbuilders “effectively under-price monopoly systems by allotting users substantially higher system capacity for broadband.”\(^{311}\)

**UNDERMINING COMPETITIVE ACCESS TO VITAL CONTENT, EQUIPMENT AND SERVICES**

Cable operators enter into agreements with unaffiliated programming providers for the exclusive rights to deliver the programmer’s content. Cable operators are now adapting that practice to the next battleground for subscribers – VOD services. As was stated in *The New York Times*, “[t]he most prominent addition to the panoply of digital services is video on demand.”\(^{312}\) Cable operators have also denied potential competitors access to VOD content indirectly by forming exclusive agreements with equipment suppliers that expressly deny rivals the technology (equipment, software, etc.) necessary to deliver VOD programming.\(^{313}\)

Several large cable operators –Time Warner, Advance/Newhouse Partnership, Comcast and Cox Communications – are partners in a consortium called iN DEMAND. This venture has already signed content distribution deals with major entertainment producers (Artisan, Universal, DreamWorks, Sony, Twentieth Century Fox, ESPN and Hallmark) and sports leagues (hockey, basketball, tennis, and NASCAR, among others).\(^{314}\) While the content developer contracts do not appear to be exclusive, the iN DEMAND service, according to wireline competitors, is offered only to cable customers that subscribe to the services of iN DEMAND’s owners.\(^{315}\) See Table 16.

In apparent response, at least one overbuilder, RCN, has recently started a service called RCN Impulse On-Demand, now available in Philadelphia, New York City, Boston, and Lehigh Valley, Pa.\(^{316}\)

Overbuilders find it difficult or impossible to obtain the content that is essential to make their cable, wireless or IP distribution alternatives competitive. Intertainer, a competing provider of Internet-based VOD service, recently filed an antitrust suit “against AOL Time
Warner, Sony, Universal and Movielink . . . who control more than 50 percent of the theatrical motion picture business and more than 60 percent of the music business,”317 for “attempt[ing] to hinder and delay the emergence and expansion of IP VOD services . . . in order to protect and control their revenues.”318

Table 16. Maintaining the Monopoly by Controlling Video-on-Demand Services

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>VOD Provider</th>
<th>Cable Affiliation</th>
<th>Exclusion of Competitors</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>iN DEMAND (service)</td>
<td>Joint venture of four cable operators –Time Warner, Advance/Newhouse, Comcast and Cox</td>
<td>“[iN DEMAND] indicated that they could not do business with Everest because they had exclusive agreements with their owners, who are large cable operators.” WideOpenWest, another overbuilder, was informed that VOD servers were “unavailable in any market where WideOpenWest competes with a named incumbent cable operator.”</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Concurrent (equipment)</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>RCN: “Seachange and Concurrent, have shown an affinity for the largest cable providers that have impeded RCN’s efforts to negotiate acceptable contracts for the deployment of their technology . . . [Time Warner Cable] has exerted its monopsony buying power to negotiate exclusive noncompete clauses in its contracts with both companies that prevent RCN from deploying technology provided by either Seachange or Concurrent in any market in which Time Warner operates”</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SeaChange (equipment)</td>
<td>Comcast has an Equity Investment in SeaChange and a Video-on-Demand Purchase Agreement</td>
<td>See Concurrent above</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Sources: See Table Notes.

Another recent attempt by cable to curtail competition by limiting access to content has centered on electronic programming guides (EPG). These guides provide customers with on-screen listings of the available cable channels and programs, together with interactive features that enable customers to do things such as program favorite channels, search for shows by subject, set reminders for when programs are on, and block channels from children. These guides have become increasingly important as digital cable has rapidly expanded the number of available channels.

At least one overbuilder has been informed that it might not be permitted to use an interactive programming guide in any market where it competed directly against an unspecified incumbent.319 RCN was told that it couldn’t license TV Gateway in any market where RCN competes against that guide’s owners, Comcast, Charter, Adelphia and Cox.320 And the incumbents have also taken anti-competitive actions against the only interactive EPG
that competes against their own. Time Warner has “invaded broadcast signals transiting its systems . . . to remove Gemstar’s EPG data” in the past and has threatened to do so again in the future.\footnote{321}

At the other end of the distribution line, cable operators have contrived to limit the use of cable converter boxes located on customer premises to decode content delivered by other providers. The 1996 Act required open standards for set-top boxes.\footnote{322} But consumer groups have complained in the past that cable operators have effectively evaded these requirements “[b]y slow-rolling the technical standard and forcing would-be set-top box competitors to sign an egregious licensing agreement whereby the company signing the agreement would have to virtually forfeit their intellectual property. The cable companies have killed any near-term possibility of an open set-top market.”\footnote{323} This has allowed cable operators to continue charging above-cost prices on the set-top boxes themselves and to lower the threat that DBS or overbuilders could break into the market at a lower cost by inviting consumers to use the set-top box they already own to decode another provider’s signal. Several cable operators have even negotiated deals with set-top box manufacturers that forbid sales of the same equipment to competing wireline providers.\footnote{324}

Overbuilders have also complained that cable incumbents have hindered their ability to build-out systems, interfering with the process of hiring contractors.\footnote{325} Some cable operators have apparently required contractors to sign non-compete clauses in their contracts and have threatened any contractors found working for overbuilders with reprisals.\footnote{326}
CONCLUSION

DEREGULATION OF THE CABLE INDUSTRY HAS FAILED

Cable television has become the primary means for Americans to receive entertainment, news and information. Additionally, large cable operators have become the vital link in our nation’s ability to access broadband Internet, which will continue to grow as a virtual “town square” for American discourse. As with many other vital industries that have developed in America, e.g., railroads, petroleum, telephone service, when a handful of companies dominate the market, consumers are gouged, competitors are stifled, and regulators are stymied.

This report documents the continuing trend of large cable operators to raise prices since deregulation. The FCC has once again confirmed this trend with the July 2003 release of its 2002 Report on Cable Prices. Moreover, the GAO has confirmed the same. Both agencies have agreed that only the presence of a wireline competitor has an effect on prices. DBS has not yet had any such impact. The problem is that overbuilders serve only a tiny fraction of homes in America. In effect, there is no price competition for cable service. And it remains clear that incumbent cable operators have not and, at least for the foreseeable future, will not ever compete against one another. To the contrary, they work hard through joint ventures and industry trade associations to coordinate various marketing and technology programs.

Large cable operators remain vertically integrated. They own or control much of the decisional programming in America, including critical regional sports programming. This enables them to decrease their programming costs; however, it has not inspired them to decrease the consumers’ bills. It has enabled vertically integrated cable operators to discriminate against cable competitors when such programming is delivered terrestrially, denying competitors the opportunity to air critical programming.

The cable industry has become enormously concentrated in a few large operators. Three incumbents control 56 percent of the market. These large operators are also geographically clustered, becoming the main providers of video services in a community. This allows a cable operator to dominate the news, information and entertainment choices for their subscribers. The concentration and clustering of the cable market has not prevented price increases for consumers. This is not what Congress intended when the cable industry was deregulated.

Cable operators are now the largest providers of broadband Internet service. This is a huge new profit center for cable operators, but these profits have not led to price decreases for consumers either. What is of great concern, but cannot be entirely predicted at this time, is what impact the dominance of broadband will have on the future development of the nation’s virtual town square. Will content be limited? Will competitors be allowed to access cable operator’s bandwidth? Will low-income consumers be locked out of broadband communications? These and many other questions must be examined as broadband grows.
Just as over-the-air broadcast for radio and television were dominant providers of information in an earlier era, and as cable television is now, certainly broadband Internet is likely to reach that level of influence. Given the anti-competitive history of cable operators, policy makers and consumers should monitor these developments very closely.

Since its inception and growth throughout the second half of the 20th century, cable television service has brought an enormous amount of popular news and entertainment programming into the living rooms of America. The cable industry has used public rights of ways to access those homes, and in turn, made huge profits. This report has made it clear that the cable industry has not lived up to its public and civic responsibilities as holders of valuable public franchises and licenses.

The failure of the Federal Communications Commission and other federal agencies to recognize, admit and take effective steps to prevent the pervasive pattern of anti-consumer and anticompetitive behavior of the cable companies is shocking. Evidence of the abuse of market power abounds in both the video and high-speed Internet markets, yet the FCC insists that competition is vigorous in the industry.

The time has come for Congress and state and local governments, to take action. Responsibility for oversight of the industry must be moved out of Washington, where regulators have demonstrated an inability to recognize or address the pervasive anti-competitive, anti-consumer practices of the powerful cable corporations. The problems documented in this report demand action to restore and create competition in the multichannel video market and an environment in which consumer choice drives corporate decisions and the public interest is promoted.

**MOVE DECISION MAKING OUT OF WASHINGTON AND CREATE CONSUMER CHOICE**

*Congress must empower state public utility commissions (PUC) to regulate all cable rates and charges for video services until meaningful competition emerges.*

Congress should allow state public utility commissions the authority to regulate all cable rates and charges and to combat anti-competitive predatory-pricing business practices. With the 1996 Act’s deregulation, rates for the cable programming tier to which the vast majority of consumers subscribe have inflated without restraint. Consumer rate protections at the state level are needed, but state PUC rate regulation is only necessary and desirable until robust competition that actually disciplines cable prices emerges.

*Return authority to local communities.*

Preemptive provisions of the Act have thwarted attempts by local communities to protect cable subscribers from the worst of the industry’s depredations. These preemptive provisions must be abolished so that policy control may be returned to community leaders.
who are closest to consumers and who are most committed to ensuring that their communities have access to multiple providers of competitively priced video services.

**Introduce à la carte programming requirement to expand consumer choices.**

Consumers should be able to choose their own suite of programming, rather than being force-fed the programming tiers that cable operator want them to purchase. Consumers must be given the right to purchase every individual channel on an *à la carte* basis at fair, reasonable and nondiscriminatory prices.

**Ensure consumer input with a public board member.**

A public member representing subscribers should be placed on the board of directors of any cable operator with a greater than four percent market share of cable households as a condition of franchise or FCC approval. Such a public member should have no current or prior affiliation with a cable, broadcast or DBS distributor or programmer, or any of their industry trade associations, and should be barred from joining such a board as a public member for five years after serving in any such affiliation. Public members should be selected by a committee of outside directors and approved by the shareholders. This would ensure better consumer input and assist in preventing insider dealing and financial mismanagement, as has occurred with some of the nation’s leading cable operators.

**Empower the viewers and citizens.** Citizen-viewers should have a direct voice in the process of cable regulation and the opportunity to use that voice to create their own well-funded news and public affairs channels. When cities negotiate franchise agreements with cable companies, they should require that cable operators include billing inserts that invite consumers to join a local Cable Action Group that would operate a local Audience Channel, well-funded and equipped by the cable company. Such a group would serve a dual purpose: operating the local channel and organizing consumers into a mobilized interest group to advocate for pro-consumer and pro-democracy media policy. Alternatively, local or state governments could assist in fundraising for the Cable Action Group, by collecting membership dues through inserts in tax or license renewal mailings. Illinois Citizen Utility Board (CUB) is funded in this manner and represents the interests of Illinois gas, electric, phone and other utility ratepayers.

**CREATE CONDITIONS THAT PROMOTE REAL COMPETITION**

**Ensure access to vital programming.**

Newly formed competitors cannot survive, let alone thrive, if cable operators are allowed to continue their anti-competitive practices of locking up must-have programming, such as sports and other regional channels. The existing federal program-access law must be modified to eliminate loopholes that have allowed the cable industry to continue these anti-competitive practices and undermine the emergence of wireline competitors. Additionally,
Cable operators should be prohibited from entering into exclusive contracts for equipment or other technical services that prevent competitor access to such programming.

*Adopt reasonably priced leased-access rates.*

Cable operators have negated their obligation to lease channel capacity to independent programmers by setting the prices so high that no competing provider could possibly pay current fees and remain commercially viable. In order to promote competition with diverse and independent programming, reasonably priced leased access must be adopted. This pro-competitive pricing should be based upon the FCC’s existing rate-setting methodology, which was designed to promote competition in the telecommunications market.

*Prohibit cable broadband content restrictions to allow consumers full use of the Internet.*

Cable operators have a long history of restricting consumer access to content that cable operators disfavor. With the cable industry’s ongoing dominance of the broadband market, they must be prohibited from restricting consumer access to Internet content or application based on the source or nature of the consumer’s request.
GLOSSARY OF TERMS


American Cable Association – Association of independent cable television businesses and owners of smaller cable systems that work together to ensure the future competitiveness and viability of their businesses. Association members primarily serve customers in small towns and rural areas across America. For more information, see web site: www.americancable.org.

American Customer Satisfaction Index (ACSI) – The Voice of the Nation’s Consumer™, the ACSI is a uniform and independent measure of household consumption experience. A powerful economic indicator, the ACSI tracks trends in customer satisfaction and provides valuable benchmarking insights of the consumer economy for companies, industry trade associations, and government agencies. For more information, see web site: www.theacsi.org.

Bandwidth – The width of a communications channel and an expression of capacity of a communication link.*

Broadband – A transmission facility providing bandwidth greater than 45 MBPS, generally fiber optic in nature.*

Broadband Service Provider Association (BSPA) – An overbuilder trade association.

Bundling – A marketing term used by a variety of customer service providers, including local, long-distance companies and cable operators, whereby several services are offered to consumers combined in one package with a discount from the aggregate per-service price or some other benefit attendant the package.

Cable operator – A statutory definition, see 47 U.S.C. §522(5). Generally, one who provides and owns or controls a cable service over a cable system.
Cable service – A statutory definition, see 47 U.S.C. §522(6). Generally, the transmission to subscribers of video programming, or other programming services, and any subscriber interaction required for the selection or use of such programming.

Cable system – A statutory definition, see 47 U.S.C. §522(7). Generally, a facility and equipment designed to provides cable service which includes video programming and which is provided to multiple subscribers within a community over any public right-of-way.

Churn rates – Monthly cancellation rate of subscribers as a percentage of total subscribers. This is a metric used for service companies as an indication of how successful they are at retaining customers.*

Community Antenna Television (CATV) – Originally, signals from distant TV stations are picked up by a large antenna, typically located on a hill, then amplified and piped all over the community below on coaxial cable.* This term is now largely in disuse, having been supplanted by either “cable service” – when referring to the video programming offering being made to consumers – or “cable system” – when referring to the facilities utilized to provide such service.

Consumer Federation of America (CFA) – CFA is first and foremost an advocacy organization, working to advance pro-consumer policy on a variety of issues before Congress, the White House, federal and state regulatory agencies, and the courts. Its staff works with public officials to promote beneficial policies, to oppose harmful policies, and to ensure a balanced debate on important issues in which consumers have a stake. For more information, see web site: www.consumerfed.org

Consumer Price Index (CPI) - Defined by U.S. Department of Labor. The CPI is a measure of the average change over time in the prices paid by urban consumers for a market basket of consumer goods and services. It is one of the most widely used measure of inflation. For more information, see web site: www.bls.gov/cpi/home.htm.

Consumers Union – Publisher of Consumer Reports, CU is an independent, nonprofit testing and information organization serving only consumers. Consumers Union’s advocates tackle consumer issues that are regional, national, and even international in. They testify before Federal and state legislative and regulatory bodies, petition government agencies, and file lawsuits on behalf of the consumer interest. For more information, see web site: www.consumersunion.org/aboutcu/about.html.

Coaxial Cable - Coaxial cable is the capacious wire used to transmit data between end-user homes and a cable company’s headend facilities.

Digital Subscriber Line (DSL) – A generic name for a family of digital lines being provided by competitive local exchange carriers and local telephone companies to their local subscribers.*
**Direct Broadcast Satellite (DBS)** – Refers to satellite television systems in which the subscribers receive signals directly from geostationary satellites via small and relatively inexpensive dish antennas typically mounted on either the roofs or sides of houses.* The principal providers of DBS in the United States are DIRECTV and EchoStar.

**DMA** – Designated Market Area. The Designated Market Area is A. C. Nielsen’s geographic market design, which defines each television market. DMAs are composed of counties (and possibly also split counties) and are updated annually by the A. C. Nielsen Company based on historical television viewing patterns. There are currently 210 DMAs in the US.

**EBITDA** – An acronym for “earnings before interest, taxes, depreciation and amortization.”*

**Federal Communication Commission (FCC)** – The federal agency established by the Communications Act of 1934 with authority to regulate interstate communications. The FCC is an independent agency and not a part of the Executive Branch although the five commissioners are presidential appointees.

**Franchise** – The right, granted by a government entity, or local franchise authority, (i.e., a municipality, city government, etc.), to a cable operator to provide service to a given area using public right of ways.

**General Accounting Office (GAO)** – an administrative arm of Congress that frequently responds to requests from U.S. Senator or Representative for information and analysis.

**Internet Service Provider (ISP)** – A vendor who provides access for customers to the Internet and the World Wide Web.*

**Local Franchising Authority (LFA)** – The governmental entity empowered to grant a cable franchise. See 47 U.S.C. §522(10).

**MMDS** – Multichannel Multipoint Distribution System. MMDS systems use wireless technology, such as microwave, to transmit cable television signals, (actually data packets - audio, video or data) from a single transmitting point to multiple receiving points.

**Monopsony** – A situation in which there is one purchaser of a good for which there are multiple suppliers. In this situation, the purchaser has significant negotiating leverage over the competing suppliers.

**MSO** – Multiple System Operator. A cable company that operates more than one cable system. The principal MSOs, by current market share, are Comcast, Time Warner Cable (a division of AOL Time Warner), Charter, Cox Communications, Adelphia Communications, Cablevision, Advance/Newhouse, Mediacom Communications, Insight Communications and CableOne.
Multichannel Video Programming Distributors (MVPD) – statutory definition, see 47 U.S.C. §522(13). This definition includes both cable operators (including cable overbuilders), DBS, SMATV, and MMDS providers.

Multiple Dwelling Unit (MDU) – Any housing structure that is broken into more than one living area to accommodate multiple family units, e.g., apartments.*

Must Carry – The provisions of the Cable Act that require carriage of certain local channels without charge to the channel provider. See 47 U.S.C. § 534. Local channels that have must carry rights opt either for free carriage or “retransmission consent,” by which they grant consent to be carried usually in exchange for a fee (and oftentimes other consideration). See 47 C.F.R. Part 76, Subpart D, §76.51 et seq. Disputes have broken out between cable operators and popular channels when negotiations for retransmission consent have broken down, sometimes resulting in cable operators removing a particular channel from their offerings in one or more communities.

National Cable Television Association (NCTA) – The NCTA, formerly the National Cable Television Association, is the principal trade association of the cable television industry in the United States. For more information, see web site: www.ncta.com

Overbuilders – Usually refers to emerging wireline cable providers that build their own facilities – hence overbuilders – in communities in order to compete with the established or incumbent cable operator (which is usually an MSO).

Program access – A provision of the 1992 Cable Act designed to prohibit (among other things) the establishment of exclusive arrangements in most circumstances between a cable operator and an affiliated video programming vendor if such programming is delivered via satellite. See 47 U.S.C. §548. This provision is often referred to as “Section 628” because it was adopted as Section 628 of the 1992 Cable Act.

Public Utility Commission (PUC) – Administrative agencies generally established by state legislatures to regulate certain specified industries usually including intrastate telecommunications (e.g., local phone service) and occasionally including cable services. The actual title of an agency in a particular state may be somewhat different – e.g., in New York: Public Service Commission; in Massachusetts: Department of Public Utility Control; in Illinois: Illinois Commerce Commission; in Iowa: Iowa Utilities Board. Commissioners may be appointed or elected as provided by state law.


Satellite Master Antenna Television (SMATV) – A distribution system that feeds satellite signals to hotels, apartments, etc., in which facilities (e.g., wires) do not cross the public rights of way. Sometimes referred to as “private cable” since the service is not subject to local franchising requirements.
Spectrum – Radio frequency spectrum. Spectrum is assigned by the FCC and is used to provide various services by transmitting data over radio waves.

Streaming – With streaming, a user can watch or listen to audio or video without downloading the whole file onto their computer (*i.e.*, the file will start playing immediately upon the start of downloading) delivered using Internet Protocol (IP).

Terrestrial Delivery – Programming delivered from land via microwave, coaxial cable, or fiber optic cables in the ground as opposed to delivery via satellite, which has been the dominant method of delivery.

Vertically Integrated – A firm is vertically integrated when it has an ownership interest in or controls a firm in an upstream or downstream market. FCC rules define when a cable operator and a video programming vendor are vertically integrated, *i.e.*, when the programming vendor is deemed “affiliated with” the cable operator for regulatory purposes, such as being subject to the program access provision (Section 628) of the 1992 Cable Act.

Video-On-Demand (VOD) – A pay-per-view subscription-based service provided by cable and satellite operators which allows consumers to order and watch movies, concerts, and other events at any time through their television’s graphic user interface.

Video Programming – A statutory definition, see 47 U.S.C. §522(20).

Wireline competitor – A video service provider that uses hybrid fiber/coax networks or similar networks that are right-of-way enabled and are much easier to add interactive and two-way services to – as opposed to satellite or MVDS service. This term usually refers to a wireline overbuilder, but may also include providers that already have facilities in place (*e.g.*, local telephone companies) that do not require new build outs.

Table 1. New York City Cable Rates. City of New York, Department of Information Technology and Telecommunications, Office of Franchise Administration and Planning. See www.nyc.gov/html/doitt/html/cablefranchise.html

Table 2. Local Regulators Are Helpless and Outraged

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<td>Montgomery County, MD.</td>
<td>A. Gowen, County Panel Questions Cable Switch, Washington Post (Aug. 8, 2002).</td>
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<td>Dallas, TX.</td>
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<td>Cary, NC.</td>
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<td>E. Coyle, Mediacoop Stops Paying City Fee, Raises Net Rate, Telegraph Herald (May 12, 2002).</td>
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Table 3. Cable Operators Move Popular Channels from Analog to Digital Tiers

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<td>Palo Alto, CA.</td>
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<td>Richmond, VA.</td>
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<td>Cable Users Pay More with Program Switch, MilwaukeeChannel.com (Jan. 2, 2002).</td>
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Table 4. Increased Revenues Outpace Costs
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Table 8. Overbuilders Force Cable Incumbents To Reduce Prices Sharply


Table 10. Maintaining the Monopoly Through the Control of Programming
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Table 14. Maintaining the Monopoly through Access to Multiple Dwellings - Units (MDUs)

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Table 12. Maintaining the Monopoly by Limiting Access to Regional Networks


Table 13. Maintaining the Monopoly through Regulation


Table 14. Maintaining the Monopoly through Access to Multiple Dwellings - Units (MDUs)

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**Table 15. Maintaining the Monopoly by Preventing Broadband Internet Distribution of Programming 1996-Present.**


**Table 16. Maintaining the Monopoly by Controlling Video-on-Demand Services.**

FIGURE SOURCES

Figure 1. Long Term View of Cable Price Increases

Figure 2. Details on Cable Rate Increase After the 1992 Act

Figure 3. Cable Rate Hikes: 1999-2002, Selected Markets
Comcast Rate Hike Adds ‘Insult to Injury’ in Montgomery County, MD.

Many Customers

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Figure 5. Cable Faces Very Little Overbuild Competition
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Figure 6. Large Cable Companies Charge More
2001 Report on Cable Prices at Attachment B-3 (noncompetitive markets).
ENDNOTES


8 There often is confusion in the citing of statistics for wireline competition. Using the FCC’s “effective competition” test, 671 -- or approximately 2 percent -- of the 33,246 cable community units nationwide have been found to meet this test. Id. From the perspective of the actual number of subscribers that choose an overbuilder as their service provider, there are approximately 1 million such subscribers -- 1.3 percent -- out of a base of 89.9 households that subscribe to multichannel video programming services. See Ninth Video Competition Report at ¶ 15, 105.


11 Id., 47 U.S.C. § 573(c). But see City of Dallas v. FCC, 165 F.3d 341 (5th Cir. 1999) (preserved local franchising authority and thus made clear that an OVS certification could not be used to evade local right-of-way authority and thus obviate the need for reaching agreement with local communities for the use of their property).


18 Ninth Video Competition Report at ¶¶ 5, 105.

19 Id. at ¶¶ 103, 104.

20 Id. at ¶ 105.

21 Id. at ¶ 53.


24 See Ninth Video Competition Report at ¶ 58.


See Implementation of Section 3 of the Cable Television Consumer Protection and Competition Act of 1992; Statistical Report on Average Rates for Basic Service, Cable Programming Service, and Equipment, Report on Cable Industry Prices, 17 FCC Rcd 6301 & n. 9 (2002) (“2001 Report on Cable Prices”). There are four “tiers” of service – packages of programming channels – generally referred to by regulation. The primary level of cable television service is commonly referred to as “basic service” tier (“BST”) and must be taken by all subscribers. The content of “basic” service varies widely among cable systems but, pursuant to the Cable Act, must include all local television signals and public, educational, and governmental access channels and, at the discretion of the cable operator, may include other video programming services. One or more expanded tiers of service, known as cable programming service tiers (“CPST””) for purposes of regulation, and often (usually) designated as “expanded basic” by cable operators, also may be offered to subscribers. These expanded tiers of service usually include programming channels delivered to the cable operator via satellite, such as TBS, CNN, USA Network, etc. Premium services are cable networks provided by a cable operator to subscribers on a per channel basis for an extra monthly fee, and usually include such channels as HBO, Showtime, etc. Pay-per-view (“PPV”) services are cable networks provided on a per program basis. PPV service is a separate category from premium service. See Ninth Annual Video Competition Report at nn. 12, 13.


programming and equipment rate increases in constant dollars calculated according to the following methodology: July 1996 CPI = 157. June 2002 CPI = 179.9. June 2002 rate in 1996 dollars = (39.47)*(157/179.9) = 34.45. Increase from July 1996 to June 2002 in constant 1996 dollars = (34.45-26.57)/26.57 = 29.64 percent. Calculations for competitive cable systems using the same methodology yield a 49.24 percent real rate increase and a 30.24 percent adjusted rate increase.


42 See 2001 Report on Cable Prices at ¶ 28.

43 See 2001 Report on Cable Prices at ¶ 8.

44 See 2001 Report on Cable Prices at ¶ 28.


46 The FCC’s methodology that led to “competitive differential” of only 6.2 percent, in contrast to the GAO’s finding of 17 percent, has been harshly criticized. See Testimony of William B. Shear, Acting Director, Physical Infrastructure, General Accounting Office, before the Senate Committee on Commerce, Science and Transportation, May 6, 2003, available at http://www.senate.gov/~commerce/hearings/testimony.cfm?id=749&wit_id=2016 (accessed May 6, 2003) (“Shear Testimony”) at 1 (“FCC’s 2002 survey does not provide a reliable source of information on the cost factors underlying cable rate increases.”).

47 Consumers Union Press Release, ‘Tis the Season for Higher Cable Bills (Nov. 26, 2002).

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52 See Consumer’s Union Press Release, Cable Price Hikes, Broken Promises Prompt Call for New Oversight (July 24, 2002).

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1. Id. at ¶ 10.

2. See 2000 Report on Cable Prices at Tables 5 and 6; 2001 Report on Cable Prices at Tables 4 and 5; 2002 Report on Cable Prices, at Tables 4 and 5.


4. 2002 CFA/CU Study at 18.


9. 2003 CU/CFA Study at 3.

10. See id.

11. See id.


14. For example:

Time Warner Cable second quarter 2003 results highlights:
- Operating income up 6 percent
- Revenues up 9 percent
- Subscription revenues up 13 percent


Cox second quarter 2003 results highlights:
- Operating cash flow up 20 percent
- Revenues up 14 percent
- 112,452 broadband Internet subscribers added, for a total of 1.7 million, reflecting 50% year-over-year growth


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98 With respect to DBS, see Banc of America Securities, Cable Industry 1Q03 Preview and Industry Outlook (April 29, 2003), at 28 figure 15 (showing 2002 programming expenses for EchoStar and DIRECTV at 37 percent and 40 percent of monthly programming revenue, respectively) and Morgan Stanley, Broadband Cable (October 4, 2002), at 84 exhibit 72 (showing cable operator 2002E programming expenses at 29.4 percent of basic revenue). With respect to overbuilders, the major MSOs – Comcast, AOL Time Warner, Charter, Cox, Adelphia, Cablevision – also have a competitive advantage vis-à-vis smaller cable operators because of their bargaining power over programmers. See, e.g., Testimony of James M. Gleason, President & COO, CableDirect, before the U.S. Senate Committee on Commerce, Science and Technology, May 6, 2006, available at http://www.senate.gov/~commerce/hearings/testimony.cfm?id=749&wit_id=2020 (accessed May 6, 2003).

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AT&T/Comcast Order at ¶ 121; see Ninth Video Competition Report at ¶ 110, n. 377.


Ninth Video Competition Report at ¶ 115.


Ninth Video Competition Report at ¶ 113.

See, e.g., Applications and Public Interest Statement at 31, Applications for Consent to Transfer of Control of Licenses Comcast Corporation and AT&T Corp., Transferors, to AT&T Comcast Corporation, Transferee, MB Docket No. 02-70 (FCC filed Feb. 28, 2002); Reply Comments of AT&T Corp. and MediaOne Group, Inc. at 7, Applications for Consent to the Transfer of Control of Licenses MediaOne Group, Inc., Transferor, to AT&T Corp., Transferee, CS Docket No. 99-251 (FCC filed Sept. 17, 1999).

2001 Report on Cable Prices at ¶42.

See 2001 Report on Cable Prices at ¶ 45 (“as the number of subscribers belonging to the MSO of which the cable operator is a part increases, the rates charged by that MSO also increase”); 2000 Report on Cable Prices at 31 (“as clustering increased, average monthly rates also increased”).

See 2002 Report on Cable Prices at Table 4.

2002 CFA/CU Study at 6.


AT&T/Comcast Order at ¶ 45.


2001 Report on Cable Prices at ¶ 36.

2001 Report on Cable Prices at ¶ 24, Table 3.

2002 Report on Cable Prices at ¶ 47.

2001 Report on Cable Prices at ¶ 47.

155 See Shear testimony at 4.
156 2002 CFA/CU Study at 4, 6.
158 Compare Department of Labor, Bureau of Labor Statistics, Consumer Price Index – All Urban Consumers, Cable Television (indicating an annual average increase of roughly 6 percent) with Department of Labor, Bureau of Labor Statistics, Consumer Price Index – All Urban Consumers, All Items (indicating an average annual increase from 1992-2001 of less than 3 percent), http://www.bls.gov/cpi (accessed Jan. 27, 2003). A nationally representative survey of direct broadcast satellite subscribers finds that the median total cost (including installation charges) of a DBS system was $300 in 1998; $195 in 1999; and $150 in 2000. Yankee Group, DBS Subscriber Study 2000 at 17 (2000). According to AT&T’s expert, DBS “routinely” offers promotions that entirely eliminate these up-front installation charges. Declaration of Janusz A. Ordover ¶ 81, attached to Reply to Comments and Petitions to Deny Applications for Consent to Transfer Control, Applications for Consent to Transfer Control of Comcast Corp. and AT&T Corp. to AT&T Comcast Corp., MB Docket No. 02-70 (FCC filed May 21, 2002).
160 Id.
165 Id.
166 SalomonSmithBarney, Industry Note, Cable, at 3 (Dec.3,2002)
170 See Application of EchoStar Communications Corporation, (a Nevada Corporation), General Motors Corporation, and Hughes Electronics Corporation (Delaware Corporations) (Transferors) and EchoStar Communications Corporation (a Delaware Corporation) (Transferee), Hearing Designation Order, 17 FCC Rcd 20559 at ¶¶ 31, 256 (2002); Comments of DIRECTV, Inc. at 13, Annual Assessment of the Status of Competition in the Markets for the Delivery of Video Programming, CS Docket No. 01-129 (FCC filed Aug. 3, 2001).
171 A Primer for New Satellite Professionals, Satellite Broadcasting Cable Association, May 19, 2003, at 50 (in the period 2001-2002, rural share increased from 45 percent to 47 percent while urban share decreased from 23 percent to 20 percent).
175 Ninth Video Competition Report at ¶61.
176 Declaration of Robert D. Willig on Behalf of EchoStar Communications Corporation, General Motors Corporation, and Hughes Electronics Corporation ¶ 17, attached to Opposition to Petitions to Deny and Reply Comments, Application of EchoStar Communications Corporation, General Motors Corporation, Hughes Electronics Corporation, and EchoStar Communications Corporation Transferee, for Authority to Transfer Control, CS Docket No. 01-348 (FCC filed Feb. 25, 2002); Reply Comments of EchoStar Satellite Corporation at 5, Annual Assessment of the Status of Competition in the Markets for the Delivery of Video Programming, MB Docket No. 02-145 (FCC filed Aug. 30, 2002).
177 Starband Press Release, Starband Files for Chapter 11; Gilat Commits Interim Financing (June 3, 2002).
179 See Ninth Video Competition Report at ¶ 66.
183 See P. Howe, AT&T’s Cable Rates Rising 7.8 percent On Average, Boston Globe (Nov. 23, 2002).
186 Preferred Communications, Inc. v. City of Los Angeles, 754 F.2d 1396 (9th Cir. 1985), aff’d in part and remanded, 476 U.S. 488 (1986), aff’d on narrower grounds, on retrial, 67 Rad. Reg. 2d (P&F) 366 (C.D. Cal. 1990); Preferred Communications, Inc. v. City of Los Angeles, 13 F.3d 1327, 1332 (9th Cir. 1994).
191 See Cable Competition Report at ¶ 80.

17 U.S.C. § 111(a)(4); id. § 119(b); See GAO, Telecommunications: The Effect of Competition From Satellite Providers on Cable Rates, Report to Congressional Requesters, at 5, 12 (July 2000).

DOJ, Complaint ¶ 36, U.S. v Primestar, et al., Civil No.: 1:98CV01193 (JLG) (filed May 12, 1998).


See 47 U.S.C. § 548(c)(2)(C)-(D); 47 C.F.R. § 76.1002(c).


See id. ¶ 59.

See 47 U.S.C. § 536(a); 47 C.F.R § 76.1300 et seq.


Forty States Sue Cable Companies over Programming Policy, Antitrust Report at 1 (May/June 1993); Justice Department Files Antitrust Suit and Proposed Consent Decree Against Primestar Group for Anti-competitive Practices, U.S. Newswire (June 9, 1993).


See Proposed Final Judgment and Competitive Impact Statement, United States v. Tele-Communications, Inc. and Liberty Media Corp., No. 94-0948, 59 Fed. Reg. 24,723, 24,727 (May 12, 1994); Primestar New York Decree, 1993-2 Trade Cas. (CCH) ¶ 70,403, §§ IV(A)-(C); Primestar Federal Decree, 1994-1 Trade Cas. (CCH) ¶ 70,562, §§ IV(A), IV(C)(3); Primestar New York Decree, 1993-2 Trade Cas. (CCH) ¶ 70,403 § IV(E), (F); Primestar Federal Decree, 1994-1 Trade Cas. (CCH) ¶ 70,562 § IV(B).


See EchoStar v. FCC, 292 F.3d 749 (D.C. Cir. 2002).


See www.broadwing.com/company/for company background and network map.


Reply Comments of WideOpenWest Holdings, LLC at 8, Annual Assessment of the Status of Competition in the Market for the Delivery of Video Programming, CS Docket No. 01-129 (FCC filed Jan. 15, 2002).


Ninth Video Competition Report, at ¶ 141 citing Utilicorp Comments at 9, SBCA Comments at 17-18.
Ninth Video Competition Report, at ¶ 145 & Table C-3.

ATT&T/Comcast Order at ¶ 37 n.80.

See Letter from Perry C. Parks III, President, Los Angeles Cable Operators Association, to Hon. Mark Ridley-Thomas, Chair, Information Technology and General Services Committee, October 2, 2002.

See Letter from Jack Valenti, President, Motion Picture Association of America, to Mayor James C. Hahn and Members of the City Council, October 2, 2002.

Opinion No. 2002:11, transmitted from Rockard J. Delgadillo, City Attorney, to James Hahn, Mayor.

Los Angeles City Council, October 1, 2002, Agenda Item 27.

See also Testimony of Leo J. Hindery, Jr., Chairman & CEO, YES Network, before the U.S. Senate Committee on Commerce, Science and Technology, May 6, 2006 at 2 (proposing amendments to Section 616 of the Cable Act because “‘program access’ must now be embedded, by legislation and by regulation, into the operating practices of the cable industry.”), available at http://www.senate.gov/~commerce/hearings/testimony.cfm?id=749&wit_id=2021 (accessed May 6, 2003).

aff’d, 800 F.2d 711, 717 (8th Cir. 1986); Berkshire Cablevision v. Burke, 571 F. Supp. 976, 986-987 (D.R.I. 1983).

See, e.g., Omega Satellite Products Co. v. City of Indianapolis, 694 F.2d 119, 126 n.27 (7th Cir. 1982).


47 C.F.R. §§ 63.54, 63.56, printed in Applications of Telephone Companies for Section 214 Certificates for Channel Facilities Furnished to Affiliated Community Antenna Television Systems, Final Report and Order, 21 FCC2d at 330-331 (1970).

See 47 U.S.C. § 533(b), See 47 C.F.R. § 63.54(a) (interpreting 47 U.S.C. § 533(b)).


AT&T/Comcast Order at ¶ 123.

See Reply Comments of WideOpenWest Holdings, LLC at 6, Annual Assessment of the Status of Competition in Markets for the Delivery of Video Programming, CS Docket No. 01-129 (FCC filed Jan. 15, 2002).

See Utilicorp/Everest Connections/Exop Comments at 5-6.


Utilicorp/Everest Connections/Exop Comments at 7-8.


Id., at §532(a).
275 See 47 U.S.C. §251(c)(3); 47 C.F.R. § 51.319.
277 The United States Conference of Mayors, Memorandum to Member Mayors from J. Thomas Cochran, Executive Director, May 23, 2003, Re: Resolutions for the 71st Annual Conference of Mayors, Resolution No. 60 (submitted by The Hon. Michael Guido, Mayor of Dearborn, Acting Chairman of the Transportation and Communications Committee, and The Hon. Manual Diaz, Mayor of Miami).
278 Id.
279 U.S. Department of Commerce, A Nation on Line: How Americans are Expanding Their Use of the Internet (Washington, D.C: 2001), p. 5, puts the figure at 50 percent in September 2001, marking the first time a majority of American households have Internet service.
281 Ninth Video Competition Report at ¶ 46.
282 How Phone Companies Lost to Cable In Consumer Broadband Battle, Wall St. J. at A6 (March 13, 2003).
283 Inquiry Concerning High-Speed Access to the Internet Over Cable and Other Facilities; Internet Over Cable Declaratory Ruling, 17 F.C.C.R. 4798 (2002). See also 47 U.S.C. § 153(20) (statutory definition of an “information service”).
284 E.g., AT&T Corp. v. City of Portland, 216 F.3d 871 (9th Cir. 2000) (defining cable modem service as a “telecommunications service” – see 47 U.S.C. §153(46)).
285 Brand X Internet Services v. FCC, No. 02-70518 (9th Cir. argued May 8, 2003).
290 How Phone Companies Lost to cable In Consumer Broadband Battle, Wall St. J. at A6 (March 13, 2003) (citing Merrill Lynch & Co.).
295 Id.


Declaration of Robert W. Crandall, at ¶ 20, attached to Petition to Deny of Verizon Telephone Companies and Verizon Internet Solutions d/b/a Verizon.net, Applications for Consent to Transfer of Control of Licenses Comcast Corporation and AT&T Corp., Transferees, to AT&T Comcast Corporation, Transferee, MB Docket No. 02-70 (FCC filed Apr. 29, 2002); see also Declaration of Janusz A. Ordover and Robert D. Willig, ¶ 117, attached to Reply Comments of AT&T Corp. and MediaOne Group, Inc., Applications for Consent to Transfer Control of Licenses, MediaOne Group, Inc. Transferor, to AT&T Corp., Transferee, CS Docket No. 99-251 (FCC filed Sept. 17, 1999).


See Applications for Consent to the Transfer of Control of Licenses and Section 214 Authorizations from MediaOne Group, Inc., Transferee, to AT&T Corp. Transferee, Memorandum Opinion and Order, 15 FCC Rcd 9816 at ¶ 121 (2000); see also id., Statement of Chairman William E. Kennard at 2.

J. Baumgartner, Eluding the Gatekeeper, CED (Apr. 1, 2002).


A. Breznick, Cable Operators Seek to Corral Bandwidth Hogs, Cable Datacom News (Oct. 1, 2002).


Ex Parte Letter from the Coalition of Broadband Users and Innovators to Michael Powell, Chairman, FCC, and Commissioners, CS Docket No. 02-52, et al., at 1 (Nov. 18, 2002).


arrangements with their owners.”); See Reply Comments of WideOpenWest Holdings, LLC at 8-9, Annual Assessment of the Status of Competition in Markets for the Delivery of Video Programming, CS Docket No. 01-129 (FCC filed Jan. 15, 2002).


318 Complaint § LVII, Intertainer Inc. v. AOL Time Warner Inc., et al., Case No. 02-CV-7406 (C.D.Cal. filed Sept. 23, 2002).

319 See Reply Comments of WideOpenWest Holdings, LLC at 9, Annual Assessment of the Status of Competition in Markets for the Delivery of Video Programming, CS Docket No. 01-129 (FCC filed Jan. 15, 2002).

320 Petition of RCN Telecom Services, Inc., To Deny Applications or Condition Consent, Applications for Consent to the Transfer of Control of Licenses, Comcast Corporation and AT&T Corporation, Transferors, to AT&T Comcast Corporation, Transferee, MB Docket No. 02-70 (FCC filed Apr. 29, 2002).


324 See Utilicorp/Everest Connections/Exop Comments at 8; Reply Comments of WideOpenWest Holdings, LLC at 9, Annual Assessment of the Status of Competition in the Market for the Delivery of Video Programming, CS Docket No. 01-129 (FCC filed Jan. 15, 2002); Petition of RCN Telecom Services, Inc., To Deny Applications or Condition Consent, Applications for Consent to the Transfer of Control of Licenses, Comcast Corporation and AT&T Corporation, Transferors, to AT&T Comcast Corporation, Transferee, MB Docket No. 02-70 (FCC filed Apr. 29, 2002).

325 Ninth Video Competition report at ¶¶ 110-111.

326 Id.